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Administrative States: Beyond Presidential
Administration
Jessica Bulman-Pozen*
Presidential administration is more entrenched and expansive than ever.
Most significant policymaking comes from agency action rather than legislation.
Courts endorse “the presence of Presidential power” in agency decisionmaking.
Scholars give up on external checks and balances and take presidential direction
as a starting point. Yet presidential administration is also quite fragile. Even as
the Court embraces presidential control, it has been limiting the administrative
domain over which the president presides. And when presidents drive agency
action in a polarized age, their policies are not only immediately contested but
also readily reversed by their successors.
States complicate each piece of this story. In critical respects, federalism
further strengthens presidential administration. Waivers, grants, nonpreemption
of state law, and other intergovernmental techniques enable presidents to
effectuate policy agendas when federal agencies lack sufficient authority. States
also furnish durability because their policies may outlast a president’s tenure
when federal policies do not. At the same time, federalism diversifies
administration and broadens its representative base. Defenses of presidential
power as “accountable” and “effective” sound increasingly empty, if not
dangerously autocratic. Yet it is easier to condemn presidential administration
than to locate alternatives that connect the administrative state to electoral
politics and representative institutions as well as to expertise and deliberation.
Because state legislators and governors may furnish these connections, plural
administrative states offer the most promising path forward for the contemporary
administrative state.
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Introduction
Although the reach of federal agencies has never been greater, nearly
every significant administrative action finds itself vulnerable to legal
challenge, political reversal, or both. The Environmental Protection
Agency’s Clean Power Plan,1 the Department of Homeland Security’s
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)2 and Deferred Action for

1. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); see Press
Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President in Announcing the Clean
Power Plan (Aug. 3, 2015, 2:15 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015
/08/03/remarks-president-announcing-clean-power-plan [https://perma.cc/T8LL-3W46] (“[T]oday,
we’re here to announce America’s Clean Power Plan—a plan two years in the making, and the
single most important step America has ever taken in the fight against global climate change.”).
2. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar,
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. 1 (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter DACA Memo],
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-cameto-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2XG-HUCY]; see Press Release, White House Office of
the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012, 2:09 PM), http://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration
[https://perma.cc/4TK9-CC25] (reporting President Obama’s remarks announcing the DACA
program).
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Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) initiatives,3
and the Federal Communications Commission’s net-neutrality rules4
involved distinct subjects; they involved distinct agencies, from a multimember New Deal commission to the newest Cabinet agency; and they
involved distinct forms of agency action, from notice-and-comment
rulemaking to guidance. But all seem to have met the same unhappy fate.
Even before President Obama left office, these agency actions had been
challenged in court,5 and the Trump Administration has now withdrawn each
of the policies.6 The same is true of numerous other Obama-era policies, from
3. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to León
Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al. 3 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter DAPA
Memo],
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action
_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5M6-KVLH]; see Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y,
Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014, 8:01 PM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-addressnation-immigration [https://perma.cc/4JEV-ZDXF] (reporting President Obama’s remarks
announcing the DAPA program).
4. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19738 (Apr. 13, 2015) (codified at
47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 8 & 20); see also In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd.
5601, 5603–04 (2015) (“grounding our open Internet rules in multiple sources of legal authority”);
Net Neutrality: President Obama’s Plan for a Free and Open Internet, WHITE HOUSE, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/net-neutrality [https://perma.cc/4CLF-8Q84] (outlining President
Obama’s plan for “a Free and Open Internet”).
5. Plaintiffs argued that the Clean Power Plan exceeded the EPA’s statutory authority and did
not merit Chevron deference. Opening Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues at 35, West Virginia
v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2016); see West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016)
(staying Clean Power Plan pending review in the D.C. Circuit). Plaintiffs argued that DACA and
DAPA ran afoul of procedural requirements and usurped Congress’s power. See Texas v. United
States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016)
(enjoining DAPA and expansion of DACA); see also Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir.
2015) (dismissing challenge to DACA for lack of standing). Plaintiffs argued that the net-neutrality
orders of 2010 and 2015 exceeded the FCC’s statutory authority. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,
825 F.3d 674, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (rejecting challenge to FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order);
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (vacating antidiscrimination and antiblocking
requirements of FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Order).
6. See Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units, 84 Fed. Reg. 32520 (July 8, 2019) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 60) (repealing the Clean Power Plan and promulgating a different rule for electric
utilities); Restoring Internet Freedom, 83 Fed. Reg. 7852 (Feb. 22, 2018) (codified at 47 C.F.R.
pts. 1, 8 & 20) (revoking net-neutrality rules); Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y,
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to James W. McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Servs., et al. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca
[https://perma.cc/5BDT-96B3] (rescinding the DACA Memo); Memorandum from John F. Kelly,
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Comm’r., U.S. Customs &
Border Prot., et al. (June 15, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications
/DAPA%20Cancellation%20Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D74-ATBP] (rescinding the DAPA
Memo). Several of these Trump Administration actions are now, in turn, being challenged in court.
See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019) (mem.)
(granting certiorari to consider legality of DACA rescission); Mozilla Corp v. FCC, No. 18-1051,
2019 WL 4777860 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 1, 2019) (largely upholding the FCC’s Restoring Internet
Freedom Order); Petition for Review, New York v. EPA, No. 19-1165 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 2019),
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the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing regulation,7 to the Department of Education’s
guidance regarding transgender students,8 to the Department of Labor’s
fiduciary duty rule,9 and more. The most straightforward, and commonly
offered, answer to the question of where these administrative decisions stand
is that they have been “gutted or [are] on the road to being gutted.”10
That is not, however, a complete answer. When the EPA announced the
Clean Power Plan’s repeal, half of the states were already meeting their
targets,11 and many are now taking additional steps to advance the Plan’s
commitment to renewable energy.12 Numerous sanctuary states and cities are
refusing to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement that would target
DACA- and DAPA-eligible immigrants,13 and some have passed legislation
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-08/documents/stofny_19-1165_pfr
_08132019.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B58-ELLZ] (petitioning the Court to find unlawful the EPA’s
Repeal of the Clean Power Plan).
7. E.g., Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing: Streamlining and Enhancements, 83 Fed. Reg.
40713 (proposed Aug. 16, 2018) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576 & 903)
(publishing advance notice of proposed rulemaking and stating that the Affirmatively Furthering
Fair Housing rule promulgated in 2015 is “ineffective” and “highly prescriptive”).
8. Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Feb. 22, 2017), http://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201702-title-ix.docx [https://perma.cc/FJ4X6REN] (rescinding Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 3
(May 13, 2016)).
9. See, e.g., Presidential Memorandum on Fiduciary Duty Rule to the Sec’y of Labor (Feb. 3,
2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-fiduciaryduty-rule/ [https://perma.cc/FQ5D-FKH3] (directing the Secretary of Labor to review the Fiduciary
Duty Rule with an eye to rescinding or revising it); Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
885 F.3d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 2018) (vacating the Fiduciary Duty Rule).
10. Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated
Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 549, 607 (2018); see
also, e.g., K. Sabeel Rahman, Reconstructing the Administrative State in an Era of Economic and
Democratic Crisis, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1671, 1700 (2018) (book review) (“The incoming Trump
Administration quickly reversed each of these [Obama Administration] regulatory initiatives.”).
11. E.g., Brad Plumer & Nadia Popovich, How Will the Clean Power Plan Repeal Change
Carbon Emissions for Your State?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2017/10/10/climate/clean-power-plan-emissions-your-state.html
[https://perma.cc
/3AHS-WY8F].
12. E.g., Climate Action Plan to Reduce Pollution, H.B. 19-1261, 72d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Colo. 2019); S.P. 457, 129th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019); S.B. 254, 80th Sess., Reg. Sess. (Nev.
2019); Energy Transition Act, S.B. 489, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2019); New York State Climate
Leadership and Community Protection Act, S. 6599, 2019–2020 Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); S.B.
5116, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); The 100 Percent Clean Energy Act of 2018, S.B. 100,
2017–2018 Sess., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); A3723, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018). See generally
States United for Climate Action, U.S. CLIMATE ALLIANCE, https://www.usclimatealliance.org/
[https://perma.cc/BH8V-TP6A] (describing alliance of 25 governors who have committed to
implementing “policies that advance the goals of the Paris Agreement”); States & Tribes, WE ARE
STILL IN, https://www.wearestillin.com/states-tribes [https://perma.cc/LB66-7KKD] (“States
are . . . taking up the mantle of climate leadership.”).
13. E.g., Protect Colorado Residents from Federal Government Overreach, H.B. 19-1124, 72d
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019); An Act Concerning the Trust Act, Pub. Act No. 19-20,

BULMAN-POZEN.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

Administrative States

12/21/2019 12:47 PM

269

maintaining particular protections for DACA recipients.14 States have
responded to the FCC’s actions by “restoring” net neutrality as a matter of
state law.15 They have likewise assumed custody of Obama-era housing,
labor, education, and other policies.16
This Article seeks to make sense of this broader landscape and to probe
its possibilities. Nearly two decades after then-Professor Elena Kagan
announced that we were living “in an era of presidential administration”17—
2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2019); S.B. 5497, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019);
California Values Act, S.B. 54, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017); Illinois TRUST Act, Pub.
Act No. 100-463, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017); H.B. 3464, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Or. 2017); see also Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143, 1160 (Mass. 2017)
(“Massachusetts law provides no authority for Massachusetts court officers to arrest and hold an
individual solely on the basis of a Federal civil immigration detainer . . . .”).
14. E.g., S.B. 1563, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2018) (exempting certain
undocumented students from paying nonresident tuition at public universities); H. 7982, 2018 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2018) (“The division of motor vehicles shall issue an operator’s or
chauffeur’s license . . . to every qualifying applicant, including, but not limited to, any current or
past recipient of a grant of deferred action under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA) program.”); see Press Release, Oregon Governor’s Office, Governor Brown Signs DACA
Legislation at May Day Celebration (May 1, 2018), https://www.oregon.gov/newsroom/pages
/NewsDetail.aspx?newsid=2697 [https://perma.cc/82SM-5ZSC] (“Governor Brown signed Senate
Bill 1563 that makes it possible for eligible students without documentation attending Oregon
colleges and universities to continue to qualify for in-state tuition, with or without a federal DACA
program.”); Press Release, Gina M. Raimondo, Governor of R.I., Raimondo Signs Legislation
Protecting Dreamers (June 18, 2018), https://www.ri.gov/press/view/33496 [https://perma.cc
/6DKE-D8ME] (“Rhode Island Dreamers with current or past DACA status will now be able to
apply for and receive drivers licenses in Rhode Island regardless of what happens to the program at
the federal level.”).
15. See, e.g., California Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality Act, S.B. 822, 2017–
2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); H.B. 4155, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2018); Act 169,
2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018); H.B. 2282 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018). See
generally Heather Morton, Net Neutrality 2019 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEG. (Oct. 1,
2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/netneutrality-2019-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/JZG4-PP87] (compiling adopted and introduced
net-neutrality legislation from twenty-nine states); Alex Johnson, California Enacts Net Neutrality
Bill, DOJ Counters with Lawsuit, NBC NEWS (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech
/internet/gov-jerry-brown-signs-bill-restore-net-neutrality-california-n915221
[https://perma.cc
/5ZKB-87R6] (describing the California law as “restor[ing] net neutrality protections that President
Donald Trump’s Federal Communications Commission killed late last year”).
16. See, e.g., Assemb. B. 686, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (introducing an
affirmatively furthering fair housing obligation into state law following the Trump Administration’s
decision not to implement the federal affirmatively furthering fair housing regulation); S.B. 383,
79th Sess., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017) (restoring the Department of Labor’s Obama-era fiduciary rule
as a matter of state law); Letter from Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. Att’y Gen., and MaryEllen Elia,
N.Y. Comm’r of Educ. (Feb. 28, 2018), http://www.nysed.gov/common/nysed/files/nysed-oagjoint-guidance-letter-2-28-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ66-8Z5H] (informing “school districts
across New York State that – irrespective of the federal government’s recent announcement [that it
would no longer investigate civil rights complaints from transgender students denied bathroom
access] – they have independent duties to protect transgender students from discrimination and
harassment in their schools and at all school functions”).
17. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246 (2001)
(announcing and defending “an era of presidential administration,” defined by the president’s
“primacy in setting the direction and influencing the outcome of administrative process”).
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and some eight decades after President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
established the basic architecture for a far-reaching, presidentially
superintended administrative state—presidential administration is stronger
than ever. Presidents rely on federal agencies to further their agendas; most
significant policymaking comes from agency action rather than legislation.18
Courts limit agency officials’ insulation from presidential appointment and
removal and bless “the presence of Presidential power” in agency
policymaking.19 Scholars who defend the administrative state take
presidential direction as their starting point. Largely giving up on external
checks and balances, they propose tempering presidential control through
bureaucracy and administrative procedure.20
As the Obama–Trump transition illustrates, however, presidential
administration is also quite fragile. When presidents drive administrative
decisionmaking in a polarized age, their policy choices are immediately
contested and readily subject to reversal.21 The very political dynamics that
yield more aggressive presidential administration also jeopardize its outputs.
With a new election, presidential administration may cannibalize itself.
Even as the Supreme Court has increasingly embraced presidential
control, moreover, it has been limiting the domain of agency decisionmaking.
Presidential power, as it has appeared in recent cases, is part of the latest
attack on today’s administrative state, not an aspect of its defense.22 If this
doctrinal development persists, presidential administration will not plausibly
be associated with a “pro-regulatory governing agenda”;23 courts may well
18. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Presidential Administration and the Traditions of
Administrative Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1968 (2015) (“By the end of the twentieth century
and accelerating at the beginning of the twenty-first, the President and the vastly expanded executive
branch have become the most powerful engine of government.”); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling
Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 698 (2016) (“Obama has elevated White House
control over agencies’ regulatory activity to its highest level ever . . . .”); Daniel A. Farber,
Presidential Administration Under Trump 4 (Aug. 8, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3015591
[https://perma.cc/6K4U-NTTZ]
(“Although borrowing governance methods from his predecessors, [Trump] may be going to greater
extremes in the frequency and degree of his reliance on those methods, so that what was previously
exceptional seems now to be a more central part of governance.”).
19. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019) (quoting Sierra Club v.
Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); see also, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055
(2018) (holding that administrative law judges are “Officers of the United States” who must be
appointed by the president, a court of law, or a head of department); Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 513–14 (2010) (holding that “double for-cause”
removal protections infringe Article II’s vesting of executive power in the president).
20. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux:
The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017); infra subpart II(B).
21. See, e.g., Mashaw & Berke, supra note 10; Bethany A. Davis Noll & Richard L. Revesz,
Regulation in Transition, 104 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3348569 [https://perma.cc/3ZV2-2GVS] (describing Trump’s particularly
aggressive rollbacks of Obama-era regulations).
22. See infra subpart II(A).
23. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2249.
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accept presidential control over agency decisions, but they are likely to deem
“pro-regulatory” decisions themselves beyond agencies’ authority.
To better understand today’s potent-yet-fragile presidential
administration, we need to bring the states into view. The president’s
effectuation of a domestic policy agenda through administrative means24 is,
in fact, still more powerful than a review of federal agency decisions alone
suggests. States critically supplement federal agency policymaking and may
succeed where federal agencies ultimately fail; the legacy of Obama’s
initiatives rests almost entirely in state hands.
Although twenty-first-century political polarization throws this state
role into sharp relief, federalism has always been a part of presidential
administration. Kagan’s own principal examples involved state
implementation of policies that federal agencies lacked sufficient authority
to carry out.25 And the basic “infrastructure”26 for presidential administration
emerged alongside New Deal cooperative federalism. Roosevelt’s Brownlow
Committee appreciated that even a robust federal administration would have
to collaborate with state and local governments to achieve certain policy
ends. It further recognized that federalism both bolstered and tempered the
argument for presidential power: intergovernmental coordination demanded
greater presidential control over federal administration, the Brownlow Report
insisted, but geographical decentralization, in turn, meant that concentrating
power in the presidency need not amount to “overcentralization.”27 State,
local, and regional implementation of presidential policies could bring an
executive-centric administrative state “nearer to the people themselves.”28
Presidential administration has changed substantially since the 1930s,
but this foundational sketch continues to shed light on contemporary
practices. In particular, if states extend the reach of presidential
24. Kagan’s definition of the phenomenon was somewhat narrower, focused on the president’s
“comparative primacy [relative to Congress, the judiciary, external constituencies, and agency staff]
in setting the direction and influencing the outcome of administrative process,” id. at 2246, although
she gestured to this broader understanding as well, see, e.g., id. at 2248 (“Faced for most of his time
in office with a hostile Congress but eager to show progress on domestic issues, Clinton and his
White House staff turned to the bureaucracy to achieve, to the extent it could, the full panoply of
his domestic policy goals.”). For discussion of the broadening of the understanding, see infra
subpart I(B).
25. See infra notes 172–77 and accompanying text.
26. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2275.
27. PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 26 (1937) [hereinafter BROWNLOW REPORT].
28. Id. at 30. The Brownlow Report states:
A general principle that may be laid down is that the decentralization should be
geographical and that more and more of the administrative work of the Executive
Branch be carried on in the field in regional units set up to cover all parts of the
United States. In this way the Government will be brought nearer to the people
themselves and by this regional organization the Federal Government may the
better cooperate with State and local governments in the conduct of its affairs.
Id.; see infra Part III.
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administration, so too can they render it more palatable. Defenses of
executive power as “accountable” and “effective” increasingly seem not only
empty but dangerously autocratic.29 Yet it is easier to condemn presidential
administration than to find plausible alternatives—modes of governance that
connect the administrative state to representative democracy and politics as
well as to deliberation and expertise. States diversify presidential
policymaking, both amplifying and limiting any particular president’s
agenda. They also furnish multiple tethers to electoral politics and the broader
public. In a political era defined by a wide-ranging federal executive branch,
limited congressional capacity, and fractious partisanship, shifting our focus
from a unitary administrative state to multiple administrative states offers a
better way to think about presidential administration and American
government more generally.
I.

The Rise and Rise of Presidential Administration
Although “presidential administration” has come to denote a wide range
of practices, the version Kagan described in 2001 was relatively narrow in its
conception of both “presidential” and “administration.” The president
superintended decisions Congress had delegated to federal agencies through
mechanisms of centralization, including regulatory review and directives. In
the first decades of the twenty-first century, presidential administration has
grown more capacious as it has incorporated strategies of politicization as
well as centralization. The rise of an executive-centered party system means
that “presidential” need not require activity by the president herself but
encompasses a partisan platform carried out by political officials across
federal agencies.30 “Administration” has also grown both more substantial
and more autonomous: confronting partisan polarization, legislative gridlock,
and aging statutes, presidents have relied heavily on agencies to set domestic
policy, and commentators have defended presidentially directed
policymaking more and more attenuated from legislative authorization.
A.

Delegation and Deference
In the late twentieth century, presidential administration consisted
principally of tools and strategies to control rulemaking, which had recently

29. Cf. JERRY L. MASHAW, REASONED ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 171
(2018) (“‘[P]residentialism’ has the vices of its virtues. . . . ‘Democracy’ should mean more than
that we elect our dictators.”).
30. See Sidney M. Milkis & Nicholas Jacobs, ‘I Alone Can Fix It’ Donald Trump, the
Administrative Presidency, and Hazards of Executive-Centered Partisanship, 15 FORUM 583, 609
(2017); cf. Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term—Foreword: Looking for Power in
Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 82–83 (2016) (“The ultimate holders of power in American
democracy are not government institutions but democratic interests: the coalitions of policy-seeking
political actors—voters, parties, officials, interest groups—that compete for control of these
institutions and direct their decisionmaking.”).
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become the most significant form of administrative action.31 Building on his
predecessors’ innovations, President Reagan established regulatory review
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as a central part of the
rulemaking process.32 President Clinton slightly modified but maintained
such regulatory review33 and also sought to spur and take ownership of
administrative action through directives to agencies and personal
appropriation of their actions.34
This wave of presidential administration thus focused on centralization,
that is, on White House control over agency actions.35 As compared to its
subsequent development, such presidential administration was relatively
modest. For one thing, the very idea of centralization posited agencies as
critically distinct from the president: the president could seek to drive or
constrain agency action, but it was not to be assumed that agencies would act
in accordance with presidential preferences; they had to be closely monitored
and subject to controls. For another, this version of presidential
administration did not displace Congress as lawmaker: it asserted the
president’s power over administrative agencies but emphasized that these
agencies were only making policy pursuant to power delegated by Congress
in the first instance.
Both of these limits were apparent in the period’s leading doctrinal and
theoretical accounts. Although courts had deferred to agency decisions long

31. See HAROLD SEIDMAN, POLITICS, POSITION AND POWER 103 (5th ed. 1998) (“In the past
the contest between the president and the Congress for power to direct executive policies and actions
focused mainly on issues related to executive branch structure. The contest has now shifted to a new
arena with jurisdiction over the review and control of regulations providing the major source of
conflict.”).
32. Exec. Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 130–31 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982);
see Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533,
547–49 (1989); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080–82 (1986).
33. Exec. Order No. 12866 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 640 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
Subsequent presidents have also maintained regulatory review. See Exec. Order No. 13777, 3 C.F.R.
293 (2018) (President Donald Trump); Exec. Order No. 13563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012) (President
Barack Obama); Exec. Order No. 13422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008) (President George W. Bush).
34. See Kagan, supra note 17, at 2281–319 (describing presidential administration under
Clinton).
35. See generally Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 235 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985) (describing techniques of
centralization and politicization). There has long been debate about whether OMB, and within it
OIRA, the agency responsible for regulatory review, can fairly be equated with the president.
Compare, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1307 (2006) (“OIRA is not the President.”) (emphasis omitted),
and Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction,
101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1342 (2013) (“OIRA review will rarely result in greater presidential
oversight.”), with Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review,
43 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 131 (2014) (“In our view, centralized regulatory review is fundamentally
about presidential control over the administrative state.”). This and other limits of centralization
have placed more pressure on strategies of politicization in recent years. See infra subpart I(B).
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before 1984, Chevron36 newly proposed that deference was warranted
because of agencies’ connection to the president:
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely
upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform
its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this
political branch of the Government to make such policy choices . . . .37
For the Court, delegation and deference worked hand-in-hand. The
primary contrast the opinion drew was between the constituency-less
judiciary and the other two “political branches.”38 The Court appreciated that
Congress would confer substantial policymaking authority on the executive
branch. It did not seek to revive a strong nondelegation doctrine, nor did it
suggest that agencies were transmission belts merely carrying out
congressional instruction or technocrats merely applying expertise to
apolitical problems.39 Instead of cleaving bureaucracy from politics, the
Court recognized the president as supplying the necessary democratic
connection. Moving away from the interest-representation model that had
sought to legitimize agency decisionmaking with reference to a diverse
public,40 the Court turned to the president as a single individual who could
represent the people.41
The notion of accountability also underlay the most prominent defense
of presidential administration. Before Kagan’s Presidential Administration,

36. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
37. Id. at 865.
38. Id. at 866.
39. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1675–78 (1975) (describing the transmission belt and expertise models of
administrative legitimacy).
40. For instance, courts in the 1970s had opened notice-and-comment rulemaking to public
participation on the front end and to public challenge on the back end. See, e.g., Ass’n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153–55 (1970) (standing); McKart v. United
States, 395 U.S. 185, 197–99 (1969) (exhaustion); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139–41
(1967) (pre-enforcement review); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240,
251–52 (2d Cir. 1977) (notice and comment); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(en banc) (notice and comment).
41. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, The “Chief Executive” and the Quiet Constitutional Revolution,
49 ADMIN. L. REV. 179, 183 (1997) (“The Chevron mystique flows from this promise that the
ordinary act of statutory interpretation can advance the larger process of reconciling agencies with
constitutional democracy.”). See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 490 (2003) (“The
presidential control model seeks to ensure that administrative policy decisions reflect the
preferences of the one person who speaks for the entire nation. In this way, it attempts to legitimate
administrative policy decisions, through presidential politics, on the ground that they are responsive
to public preferences.”).
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a number of scholars had noted the trend toward presidential centralization,42
and some had insisted on the constitutional imperative of a unitary
executive.43 But these accounts generally focused on disciplining the
administrative state. On the heels of Clinton’s presidency, Kagan offered a
more robust, pro-regulatory account of presidential control.44 For her, the
question was one of statutory interpretation, not Article II command.45
Despite this constitutional modesty, however, her account was normatively
emphatic: presidential control rendered administration democratically
responsible. Democratic accountability was in part retrospective46 but largely
prospective and procedural, grounded in the president’s consideration of
national preferences and the public’s monitoring of transparent presidential
choices.47
Although the idea that “‘We, the People’ control the bureaucracy”
through the president was subject to forceful criticism from the start,48
42. See, e.g., Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 219 (1993) (“In recent years, the particular focus has been on presidential
oversight, in part as a result of the increasingly systematic efforts of every President since Richard
Nixon to gain control of the federal bureaucracy.”); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–7 (1994) (“It is time again to ask whether
the executive is ‘unitary’ in the sense that the President must have plenary power to control
administration and execution of the laws.”); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the
Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1995) (“From the recent evidence, it seems clear
that presidential oversight of the regulatory process, though relatively new, has become a permanent
part of the institutional design of American government.”).
43. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 568–70 (1994) (“The important point here is that once history’s grab
bag of assorted enumerated powers is run through the Constitution’s trinitarian ‘funnel,’ the
President must end up with any administrative powers that otherwise cannot be accounted for.”).
44. See generally Kagan, supra note 17, at 2249 (“Where once presidential supervision had
worked to dilute or delay regulatory initiatives, it served in the Clinton years as part of a distinctly
activist and pro-regulatory governing agenda.”).
45. Id. at 2364.
46. E.g., id. at 2334 (noting that the president is the only official “elected by a national
constituency in votes focused on general, rather than local, policy issues”).
47. E.g., id. at 2335 (“[B]ecause the President has a national constituency, he is likely to
consider . . . the preferences of the general public . . . .”); id. at 2384 (“Presidential administration
. . . advances political accountability by subjecting the bureaucracy to the control mechanism most
open to public examination and most responsive to public opinion.”); see also Jerry L. Mashaw,
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95
(1985) (arguing that presidential control increases “the responsiveness of government to the desires
of the electorate”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of Presidential
Leadership in the Modern Administrative State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180, 1193–96 (1994) (arguing that
the president is politically accountable to a broader, less organized constituency, which helps him
withstand the pressures that interest groups exert on members of Congress); infra subpart V(A)
(considering the accountability argument).
48. Farina, supra note 41, at 182; see, e.g., Bressman, supra note 41, at 494 (“[M]ajoritarianism
fails to account for a concern of paramount importance in the administrative state—namely, the
concern for arbitrary administrative decisionmaking.”); Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in
the Modern State: Why a Unitary, Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate
Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 830–32 (1996) (“Critics of presidential power . . . emphasize
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developments in national politics and administrative practice were underway
that soon yielded more aggressive exercises and defenses of presidential
administration.
B.

Politicization and Polarization

The seeds of a stronger presidential administration were present in
Kagan’s account. She noted that the reemergence of divided government
made legislating difficult, so President Clinton turned to the bureaucracy to
advance his domestic policy agenda.49 Since she wrote, political polarization
has increased, and presidential administration has become a matter not only
of shaping agencies’ exercise of congressionally conferred power but also of
making policy without Congress. As the practice has expanded, so too have
commentators defended more sweeping presidential policymaking.
As an initial matter, partisan polarization has made it easier for
presidents to advance policy ends through agency action. The presidential
administration of the Reagan and Clinton years was largely defined by
attempts to control regulation from the White House, and often the person of
the president himself.50 Alongside regulatory review, directives, and other
centralizing strategies, however, a more powerful tool of presidential
administration was emerging: politicization of the bureaucracy.51 The
number of political appointees in agencies multiplied, and presidents
assumed the role of Congress and local party organizations in filling these

the failures of recent presidents: their lack of accountability to many important political
constituencies (both majoritarian and minoritarian); their inability to exercise effective leadership;
and their apparent lack of competence, let alone expertise.”); Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential
Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 444 (1987) (“[T]he
President ought to play a more limited role in regulatory agency decisionmaking than some of the
recent regulatory reform proposals suggest.”); Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System
of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161,
212–14 (1995) (“[C]onstitutional theorists who prize bureaucratic accountability should abhor any
reading of the Constitution that mandates a single structural route towards its realization.”); Sidney
A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1,
21 (1994) (“[I]ndividual voters ordinarily do not have a sufficient interest in regulatory issues to
justify monitoring governmental decisionmaking, let alone to attempt to influence it. If voters lack
an incentive to observe the behavior of their agents, elected officials have no incentive to conform
to the voters’ policy preferences.”).
49. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2248, 2250, 2311.
50. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text.
51. See DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 2 (2008) (“People
commonly refer to the act of increasing the number and penetration of appointees as ‘politicization.’
Politicized agencies, then, are those that have the largest percentage and deepest penetration of
appointees.”); David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age
of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1129 (2008) (describing a shift from
centralization strategies to politicization strategies since the 1980s); Moe, supra note 35, at 235–36,
244–45 (discussing politicization versus centralization); Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson,
Presidents and the Politics of Structure, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 18 (describing
politicization in terms of presidential appointment of “loyal, ideologically compatible people in
pivotal positions”).
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positions.52 With political appointees inside agencies, presidents would have
less need to superintend agency exercises of discretionary power through
centralization: agency officials would choose to align their policymaking
with presidential prerogatives in the first instance.53
While the number of political appointees grew throughout the latter half
of the twentieth century,54 the recent increase in political polarization has
made politicization-through-appointment a more manageable strategy. As
the parties have grown more nationally and presidentially oriented, as they
have grown more coherent and programmatic, and as they have grown more
distinct from one another, partisan labels signal views on a host of domestic
policy issues, and presidents can rely on these labels to populate agencies
well below the department-head level.55 The local party organization may
have disappeared as a player in appointments, but national partisan networks
have taken over.56 This enables presidents to appoint a thick layer of
politically aligned agency officials, even when party organizations
themselves are weak.
At the same time as Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump have continued
long-standing practices of centralization and adopted some new ones,57 then,
52. See LEWIS, supra note 51, at 3 (documenting “a dramatic expansion in the number of
political appointments”); Barron, supra note 51, at 1122–32 (describing the declining influence of
Congress and the political parties over appointments).
53. See Moe, supra note 35, at 245 (describing how presidents can make appointments “on the
basis of loyalty, ideology, or programmatic support”); see also Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E.
Gersen, Agency Design and Political Control, 126 YALE L.J. 1002, 1031 (2017) (studying federal
spending to show that the extent of high-level personnel politicization affects agencies’ political
responsiveness); George A. Krause & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Experiential Learning and
Presidential Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: Logic and Evidence from Agency
Leadership Appointments, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 914, 926–28 (2016) (showing that presidents
increasingly favor loyalty over competence in making appointments over the course of their tenure).
54. See LEWIS, supra note 51, at 3; Barron, supra note 51, at 1122–28.
55. See Michael A. Livermore, Political Parties and Presidential Oversight, 67 ALA. L. REV.
45, 62–80 (2015) (detailing how increasingly programmatic, nationally focused, and distinctive
political parties enable presidents to predict the behavior of potential appointees based on party
affiliation); see also Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party
Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 491–96 (2008) (describing
how party polarization enables presidents to effectively control independent agencies by appointing
a majority of commissioners).
56. See generally DAVID KAROL, PARTY POSITION CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 2 (2009)
(describing parties as “coalitions of groups with intense preferences on particular issues managed
by politicians”); SETH E. MASKET, NO MIDDLE GROUND 41 (2009) (suggesting “a theory of parties
that accounts for the coordination of various actors both inside and outside the government”);
Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in
American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571, 571 (2012) (arguing that parties are “best understood as
coalitions of interest groups and activists seeking to capture and use government for their particular
goals”).
57. See, e.g., Aaron J. Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White
House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577, 2583–86 (2011) (describing President Obama’s use of
“czars”); Watts, supra note 18, at 693–706 (exploring President Bush’s and President Obama’s
efforts to control administrative action); see also infra notes 188–94 (providing a catalog of
recognized techniques of presidential administration).
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they have also influenced the administrative state considerably through
appointments. The Clean Power Plan, DAPA and DACA, net neutrality—
these and their respective repeals are as much agency officials’ policy as the
president’s. The president’s directives and review of agency decisions have
been less significant than his selection of agency appointees in the first
instance.
As these examples further underscore, the political polarization that has
made it easier for presidents to “remake agencies in their own image”58 has
also underwritten bolder exercises of presidential policymaking. Especially
under conditions of divided government, Congress struggles to legislate.
With the public looking to them, presidents in turn rely on agency action.59
In President Obama’s phrase, “We Can’t Wait”: if Congress would not
address climate change, immigration, internet regulation, and other important
questions, the administration would act.60 When the Clean Power Plan,
DAPA and DACA, and net neutrality arrived in court, the main legal question
was whether statutory delegations could encompass these administrative
policies. The issue was not presidential direction of the EPA, DHS, and FCC,
but rather whether the Clean Air Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act,
and the Communications Act authorized these agencies to adopt such
policies.61
Even as litigation has focused on the connection between statutes and
administrative policy, commentators have defended a presidential
administration that is not bounded by congressional authorization but is
instead autonomous in its authority. Kagan’s account of presidential
administration depicted a powerful executive, but she took care to link
presidential administration to congressional decisions. “Administrative
action is unlikely to provide a president with all he could obtain through
legislation,” she wrote. “Congress, after all, has set bounds on administration
through prior statutory enactments.”62 In the last decade, scholars have
58. Barron, supra note 51, at 1096.
59. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today’s
Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 395,
410–12 (2009); Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law,
92 TEXAS L. REV. 1137, 1155–57 (2014); Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the
States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1752–57 (2015); see also Cary Coglianese & Kristin Firth,
Separation of Powers Legitimacy: An Empirical Inquiry into Norms About Executive Power, 164
U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1870–73 (2016) (studying how the public perceives presidential direction of
agency action).
60. E.g., Kenneth S. Lowande & Sidney M. Milkis, “We Can’t Wait”: Barack Obama, Partisan
Polarization and the Administrative Presidency, 12 FORUM 3, 6–8, 10–12, 14–15 (2014).
61. See supra note 5.
62. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2312. Kagan was skeptical of the current Congress, arguing that
the “Congress” at work overseeing exercises of administrative discretion was in fact “members of
congressional committees and subcommittees almost guaranteed by their composition and
associated incentive structure to be unrepresentative of national interests.” Id. at 2336. And she
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suggested that these prior statutory enactments may not impose substantial
limits on presidential policymaking.63
Most dramatically, Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue
that executive power is largely unconstrained by law.64 Treating the president
and agencies as continuous,65 they posit that “[l]ong-term economic and
institutional forces—most generally . . . the rapidity of change in the
policymaking environment and the institutional incapacity of legislatures and
courts to supply the necessary policy adjustments—make executive
governance inevitable.”66 Instead of indulging “tyrannophobia”67 or trying to
resurrect Madisonian separation of powers, Posner and Vermeule suggest we
should recognize politics as the only plausible check and focus on “making
executive government more credible and more responsive to public
opinion.”68
Other scholars have offered more modest accounts of the legally
unconstrained executive. Some depict the executive branch as an independent
policymaker that need not—or cannot—be bound by congressional will in
particular areas. For example, Professors Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez
argue that the president should not be constrained by congressional
immigration-enforcement priorities, which are largely a chimera.69 They
propose instead a “two-principals” model of immigration policymaking.70
Against charges of lawlessness, they respond not only that presidential
policymaking is inevitable and disciplined by politics but also that procedural
regularity and transparency are the relevant legal constraints.71 Other scholars
recognized that presidents might “push the envelope when interpreting statutes.” Id. at 2349. But
she advocated judicial review of agency action as the answer to the threat of presidential lawlessness
and never questioned that Congress was the author of the whole arrangement. Id. at 2372–73.
63. See generally Farber & O’Connell, supra note 59, at 1155, 1183 (arguing, against the
assumption “that the source of authority of agency action is statutory,” that “[i]n the real world of
administrative law, the White House is the main player”); Merrill, supra note 18, at 1958–59 (noting
that administrative governance is outrunning statutory authorization and that scholars are
increasingly justifying administrative action with respect to transparency and other process values
rather than legal authorization).
64. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 15 (2010) (“[L]aw
does little to constrain the modern executive.”); id. at 112 (“[T]he basic aspiration of liberal legalism
to constrain the executive through statutory law has largely failed.”). But see Richard H. Pildes, Law
and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1403, 1408–09 (2012) (reviewing POSNER &
VERMEULE, supra) (arguing that Posner and Vermeule do not provide empirical evidence for this
claim and in fact furnish a theoretical explanation for why self-interested presidents would accept
law as a constraint).
65. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 64, at 5–6 (defining the “executive” and noting
substantial presidential influence over both executive and independent agencies).
66. Id. at 16.
67. Id. at 177.
68. Id. at 16.
69. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125
YALE L.J. 104, 109–10 (2015).
70. Id. at 110.
71. See id. at 111, 135–36, 175, 210–12.
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call for the president to displace Congress as the nation’s principal lawmaker;
Professors William Howell and Terry Moe advocate making “Congress less
central to the legislative process and presidents more central.”72
In different ways, these and other accounts both describe and defend an
expansive, autonomous variant of presidential administration.73 Unlike early
accounts that focused on the president’s relationship to agencies, more recent
accounts assume substantial identity between the president and both
executive and independent agencies and inquire into the power of the
executive branch more generally.
II.

The Current Predicament
Today, presidential administration is entrenched and expansive.
Significant policy decisions of the Obama and Trump Administrations have
been advanced through agency action rather than legislation. But presidential
administration may also be weaker than ever. Most apparently, muscular
presidential administration can be quite fragile over time, as a new
administration has both the incentive and the ability to revise its
predecessor’s policies.74 President Obama’s most significant regulatory
achievements have been repealed or are in the process of being repealed by
the Trump Administration. The Clean Power Plan, DACA and DAPA, and
federal net-neutrality rules were all early targets of presidential directives and
agency action.75 So too were the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule;76
environmental rules regulating fracking, limiting methane leaks, and banning
drilling for oil in the Arctic; education rules furnishing protections for
transgender students and regulating campus sexual assaults; and numerous
other policies.77 For skeptics of presidential control, these reversals bolster
longstanding criticisms grounded in expertise, reasoned decisionmaking, and

72. WILLIAM G. HOWELL & TERRY M. MOE, RELIC: HOW OUR CONSTITUTION UNDERMINES
EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT—AND WHY WE NEED A MORE POWERFUL PRESIDENCY xv–xvi (2016)
(arguing that whereas Congress is parochial, the president is a national leader, concerned for her
legacy, and invested in a coherent approach to all of government, and thus a superior lawmaker).
73. See generally Merrill, supra note 18 (canvassing accounts that replace positive law with
process norms).
74. See Mashaw & Berke, supra note 10, at 607 (“The President’s ability to control
administration has become sufficiently powerful that erasing a prior Administration requires little
more than determination—and perhaps a dash of ruthlessness.”).
75. See supra note 6.
76. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20946, 20946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510 & 2550).
77. See supra notes 7–9; Philip Bump, What Trump Has Undone, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/08/24/what-trump-has-undone/?utm
_term=.e844d065f1d6 [https://perma.cc/M8TB-ZCCK] (compiling Trump reversals of Obama
regulatory policies during his first year in office). See generally Noll & Revesz, supra note 21
(documenting Trump’s rollbacks of Obama-era regulations).
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pluralism, but proponents of presidential administration also have reason to
worry about such regulatory whiplash.78
If political transitions illustrate the inability of presidential
administration to sustain policies over time, a different set of problems
appears in doctrine and scholarship. The Supreme Court increasingly
embraces presidential control over agencies, but it is setting the “president”
and “administration” at odds with one another, requiring greater presidential
control over agencies while also limiting the reach of agency policymaking.
Scholars who defend administration, in turn, respond to an overweening
president by conflating bureaucratic and representative forms of legitimacy,
threatening to undermine the force of both.
A.

Doctrine: Pro-President as Anti-Administration
As the scope of presidential administration has expanded, the Supreme
Court has developed an ambivalent doctrine: empowering the president visà-vis the bureaucracy but also seeking to limit the administrative domain over
which she presides. To the extent presidential administration’s clearest
forbearer was the unitary-executive theory, there was always some irony to
its serving as a legitimating theory of administration. But in the 1980s and
1990s, “the new formalism [did] not emphasize the nondelegation doctrine
and the dismantling of the regulatory state” even as it stressed Article II
power.79 Leveraging presidential power to undermine administrative
governance is a more recent development.
Over the past decade, the Court has cast presidential control over
agencies as both a constitutional edict and a demand of popular sovereignty.
For example, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight
Board,80 the Court invalidated “double for-cause” removal protections as
infringing Article II’s vesting of executive power in the president.81
Describing why the formal problem was also a threat to political
accountability, the Court equated presidential administration with popular
control over the bureaucracy:
Our Constitution was adopted to enable the people to govern
themselves, through their elected leaders. The growth of the Executive
Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost every aspect
of daily life, heightens the concern that it may slip from the

78. See infra subpart V(A) (considering the accountability defense of presidential
administration).
79. Farina, supra note 41, at 181.
80. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
81. Id. at 488, 495–99. The insulation was “double” because PCAOB members were appointed
by SEC Commissioners, who were themselves understood to enjoy for-cause removal protection.
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Executive’s control, and thus from that of the people.82
In Lucia v. SEC,83 the Court more modestly determined that administrative
law judges working for the SEC are inferior officers.84 It did not take up the
Solicitor General’s request that it deem for-cause removal protections for
such ALJs unconstitutional, but that question will likely return to a Court
whose newest member appears to be a committed unitary executivist.85
Recent decisions have also embraced politicized, presidentially directed
agency action. Reviewing the Secretary of Commerce’s decision to include
a citizenship question on the Census, the Court stated, “[A] court may not set
aside an agency’s policymaking decision solely because it might have been
influenced by political considerations or prompted by an Administration’s
priorities. Agency policymaking is not a ‘rarified technocratic process,
unaffected by political considerations or the presence of Presidential
power.’”86 Reviewing politicized agency decisions during the George W.
Bush Administration, the Court had invalidated executive positions it “found
untrustworthy, in the sense that executive expertise had been subordinated to
politics.”87 But in the Census case, the Court cast “political considerations”
and “Presidential power” as not only permissible, but legitimating. Even as
it held that the Secretary of Commerce’s furnished explanation was
pretextual, it opened the door to a more overtly political justification and
favorably distinguished “the Secretary’s policymaking discretion” from “the
Bureau’s technocratic expertise.”88
As its distinction between the “technocratic” and the political suggests,
at the same time as the Court has embraced presidential control, it has
82. Id. at 499; see also, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2413 (2019) (“[A]gencies . . .
have political accountability, because they are subject to the supervision of the President, who in
turn answers to the public.”); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313–14 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that “the Constitution empowers the President to keep federal officers
accountable,” but expressing concern that the President cannot sufficiently superintend agency
action in practice).
83. 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
84. Id. at 2049.
85. See, e.g., PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 164, 167 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Under Article II, an independent agency that exercises substantial
executive power may not be headed by a single Director. . . . [That Director must be] supervised,
directed, and removable at will by the President.”).
86. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019) (quoting Sierra Club v.
Costle, 657 F.3d 298, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
87. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007
SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52; see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (“EPA has offered no
reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to
climate change. Its action was therefore ‘arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance
with law.’”); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257–58 (2006) (holding that the Controlled
Substances Act did not authorize the Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescribing drugs
for use in physician-assisted suicide, and noting that the agency had not used “its expertise and
experience to formulate a regulation”).
88. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2571 (“[T]he Census Act authorizes the Secretary, not the
Bureau, to make policy choices within the range of reasonable options.”).
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expressed skepticism about the scope of administration.89 Presidential
superintendence may be necessary to administration’s constitutional and
political legitimacy, on this view, but it is not sufficient to justify the current
reach of the administrative state. A number of Justices have questioned the
doctrinal building blocks of administrative power, from a generous
nondelegation test to judicial deference. In its most recent term, the Court
imposed a new “step zero” for Auer deference and could not garner a majority
to defend such deference.90 It likewise found only four votes in support of the
longstanding “intelligible principle” approach to the nondelegation
doctrine.91 More significant than any express limitations are subtler ways in
89. See John Harrison, The Unitary Executive and the Scope of Executive Power, 126 YALE
L.J. F. 374, 375 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Harrisonforwebsite_7vou5ojq.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5NDF-3REQ] (noting Justice Alito’s distinction between the scope of executive
power and who within the executive branch controls such power); Metzger, supra note 20, at 37
(distinguishing the concern that executive power is politically unaccountable from the concern that
executive power is aggrandized).
90. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415–18 (2019) (noting that Auer deference “often
doesn’t” apply because it applies only when a regulation is genuinely ambiguous, the interpretation
is reasonable, and the interpretation is the agency’s official position that implicates its substantive
expertise and reflects its fair and considered judgment); see id. at 2424–25 (Roberts, J., concurring
in part) (joining only the parts of the opinion that did not defend the merits of Auer deference); id.
at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that “it should have been easy for the
Court to say goodbye to Auer v. Robbins,” calling on lower courts to “take courage from today’s
ruling and realize that it has transformed Auer into a paper tiger,” and noting that “this case hardly
promises to be this Court’s last word on Auer”); cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (describing Chevron step zero). In other cases,
several Justices have more generally expressed reservations about administrative discretion. See,
e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“These cases bring
into bold relief the scope of the potentially unconstitutional delegations we have come to
countenance in the name of Chevron deference.”); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199,
1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (expressing concern about
“aggrandizement of the power of administrative agencies”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d
1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron and Brand X permit executive
bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate
federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the
framers’ design.”); see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“[W]ith hundreds of federal agencies poking into every nook and cranny of daily life,
[citizens might] understandably question whether Presidential oversight—a critical part of the
constitutional plan—is always an effective safeguard against agency overreaching.”).
91. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130–31 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting that he would “support th[e] effort” to “reconsider the approach” to delegation
the Court has “taken for the past 84 years”); see id. at 2142 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing for a
substantially narrower delegation test and stating that “[t]o leave this aspect of the constitutional
structure alone undefended would serve only to accelerate the flight of power from the legislative
to the executive branch, turning the latter into a vortex of authority that was constitutionally reserved
for the people’s representatives in order to protect their liberties”); see id. at 2130 (plurality opinion)
(“[I]f SORNA’s delegation is unconstitutional, then most of Government is unconstitutional—
dependent as Congress is on the need to give discretion to executive officials to implement its
programs.”). The Gundy dissenters did not appear to have similar reservations about an open-ended
delegation to the Secretary of Commerce to make decisions about the Census. Dep’t of Commerce,
139 S. Ct. at 2576 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although not likely the
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which the Court is pruning deference. Even while applying Chevron, it has
read statutes aggressively to reject agency interpretations, including at step
two,92 and it has applied the major-question exception in a manner that
destabilizes the very premise of deference.93 Recently, Justice Gorsuch
frankly described the Court’s deployment of this doctrine as an effort to “rein
in Congress’s efforts to delegate legislative power” by a “different name[].”94
Although it remains to be seen whether the Court will meaningfully alter
the scope of the administrative state,95 at a minimum, its decisions endorse a
shift of power to the president and political appointees from other agency
employees and fire warning shots about the fate of future “pro-regulatory”96
administrative policymaking. In response to these warning shots,
commentators have assailed the Court’s reductionist equation of the president
and the people and its unspoken assumptions about where administrative
power would flow if removed from agencies. The approach suggested in
recent opinions requires either implausible assumptions about congressional
capacity or else willingness to endorse rule-by-judiciary in the service of
rationale, the comfort with this broad delegation is consistent with then-Professor Kagan’s
argument, contra extant nondelegation doctrine, for greater acceptance of delegated power when
agency actions are “clothed with the imprimatur and authority of the President.” Kagan, supra note
17, at 2369.
92. See, e.g., Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706–07 (rejecting an agency interpretation as
unreasonable at step two of Chevron).
93. The notion that a question’s deep “political significance” means it cannot be entrusted to an
agency and must instead fall to the judiciary is in considerable tension with Chevron’s suggestion
that such questions are better left to agencies than constituency-less judges. Yet in recent cases, the
Court has expanded the major-question exception “from a caution against reading broad powers
into narrow language into a general presumption that important questions are simply inappropriate
for agency resolution.” Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to Major Questions: On the
Democratic Legitimacy of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2019, 2033 (2018);
see, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (“Whether those credits are available
on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that is central
to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would
have done so expressly.” (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)));
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444–45 (2014) (“We expect Congress to speak
clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’”
(quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000))).
94. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see id. at 2142 (“Although it is
nominally a canon of statutory construction, we apply the major questions doctrine in service of the
constitutional rule that Congress may not divest itself of its legislative power by transferring that
power to an executive agency.”).
95. For different predictions, compare, for example, Jack M. Beermann, The Never-Ending
Assault on the Administrative State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1599, 1651 (2018) (“Two things seem
clear: attacks on the administrative state are likely to continue and are likely to be unsuccessful.”),
and Adrian Vermeule, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the Administrative
State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2017) (“[O]utside of a largely elite discourse of ‘classical
liberals,’ libertarians, and nostalgists for an imagined common law past, the administrative state has
never been more secure.”), with Metzger, supra note 20, at 17–33, 47–51 (cataloging judicial and
academic challenges to the contemporary administrative state and suggesting that the attack is a
genuine threat).
96. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2249.
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resolving a democratic deficit. Despite a compelling diagnosis of this “antiadministrative”97 turn, however, leading responses have themselves been
warped by the extent of presidential control over administration.
B.

Scholarship: Bureaucracy as the Separation of Powers

Confronting persistent attacks on the administrative state,98 scholars
have long sketched two complementary accounts of its legitimacy. Put
simply, “external” accounts emphasize agencies’ connections to the three
named branches of government, focusing on constitutional structure, politics,
and elections, while “internal” accounts emphasize autonomous values of
agency decisionmaking, such as expertise, deliberation, and reason-giving.99
Both an external and an internal perspective are necessary to defend the
administrative state. Neither suffices on its own. But if recent “antiadministrative” attacks tend to neglect expertise, deliberation, and reasongiving, recent “pro-administrative” defenses themselves tend to neglect
external political engagement. The reason is not hard to see. Twentiethcentury accounts emphasized ways in which the three named branches
participated in guiding and overseeing agency action.100 In Professor Peter

97. Metzger, supra note 20, at 3.
98. See generally JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 10 (1978) (arguing that “a strong and persisting challenge
to the basic legitimacy of the administrative process” recurs generation after generation); Beermann,
supra note 95, at 1599 (“[T]he assault on the administrative state is never ending.”); Cynthia R.
Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 987, 987 (1997) (“Like an intriguing but awkward family heirloom, the legitimacy problem is
handed down from generation to generation of administrative law scholars.”); Jeremy K. Kessler,
The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718, 719 (2016) (reviewing
DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN
AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014)) (“[H]owever ‘normal’ the administrative state may (in truth) be, the
American people’s ‘uneasiness’ about its legitimacy persists. The recent proliferation of scholarly
defenses of the historical pedigree of the administrative state is a testament to the distinctively
historical cast of our present generation’s ‘uneasiness.’” (quoting FREEDMAN, supra, at 9, 11)).
99. Although external accounts may claim the mantle of democracy, it is more precise to
associate such accounts with representative democracy given the frequent reliance of internal
accounts on deliberative democracy. See MASHAW, supra note 29, at 157–58 (noting “two rather
distinct grounds for the legitimacy of administrative lawmaking – agencies’ accountability to
political controllers and agencies’ capacity to exercise statutorily delegated power on the basis of
knowledge” and arguing that the distinction is not between politics and expertise so much as
between electoral and deliberative forms of democracy). That said, the deliberative-democracy
premise of justification or acceptability may “exclude certain persons from concern or . . . treat them
as hypothetical persons who would reason differently than they actually do,” id. at 169—a move
that collapses much of the space between deliberative democracy and expertise.
100. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 579 (1984) (“The theory of separation-of-powers breaks
down when attempting to locate administrative and regulatory agencies within one of the three
branches; its vitality, rather, lies in the formulation and specification of the controls that Congress,
the Supreme Court and the President may exercise over administration and regulation.”). See
generally Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy,
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Strauss’s formulation, for example, Congress, the president, and the courts
all “share[d] the reins of control” over agencies, so the separation of powers
in the administrative state was the constitutional separation of powers acting
upon the administrative state.101 But recent scholarship has all but given up
on Congress. In a concession to presidential administration as a descriptive
reality, this scholarship begins from the premise of a dominant president. It
then seeks to counterbalance presidential power with bureaucratic
mechanisms, not other representative institutions.
Recognizing that the White House has largely displaced other political
controls over administration, scholars have begun to cast expertise,
deliberation, and reason-giving as responses to presidential power as such.
The internal turn purports to do the work of external controls, but as scholars
effectively replace Congress with administrative actors, they give up too
easily on political representation beyond the president herself.
In her recent response to “the administrative state under siege,” for
example, Professor Gillian Metzger argues that bureaucracy is not only
consistent with but in fact necessary to realizing the separation of powers in
the twenty-first century.102 Because presidential administration is the “central
reality of the contemporary national government” and broad delegations from
Congress are inevitable, the constitutional imperative is to reduce the “risk
of executive branch unilateralism and aggrandizement.”103 Enter
bureaucracy: Metzger proposes that “the internal complexity of the
administrative state—the way it marries together presidential control,
bureaucratic oversight, expertise, professionalism, structural insulation,
procedural requirements, and the like— . . . holds the key to securing
accountable, constrained, and effective exercise of executive power.”104
Reviving a strand of James Landis’s defense of administrative process,105
and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s, 113 YALE L.J. 1341, 1345 (2004)
(describing the American “postwar constitutional settlement” as accepting “the concentration of
power in the executive and administrative spheres . . . on the condition that, at the subconstitutional
level, delegated authority would be subject to a range of political and legal controls that would act
as a substitute for the formal structural protections of separation of powers”).
101. Strauss, supra note 100, at 580.
102. Metzger, supra note 20, at 78.
103. Id. at 75.
104. Id. at 78; see also Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115
MICH. L. REV. 1239, 1263–65 (2017) (describing limits of external constraints and advocating
internal constraints on agency action).
105. Landis argued:
The administrative process is, in essence, our generation’s answer to the
inadequacy of the judicial and the legislative processes. It represents our effort to
find an answer to those inadequacies by some other method than merely increasing
executive power. If the doctrine of the separation of power implies division, it also
implies balance, and balance calls for equality. The creation of administrative
power may be the means for the preservation of that balance, so that paradoxically
enough, though it may seem in theoretic violation of the doctrine of the separation
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Metzger argues that bureaucratic actors and procedure are constitutionally
obligatory means of realizing separation of powers commitments in an age
of presidential administration.106
Professor Jon Michaels makes a more literal internal separation of
powers argument. If Metzger suggests that certain commitments of the
constitutional design may be realized within the administrative realm,
Michaels assigns the roles and functions of each branch to particular
administrative units: agency leaders represent the president; the civil service
represents the judiciary; and civil society represents Congress.107 The
“constitutional revivalism” he propounds likewise reasons from the reality of
a strong president in need of checks and balances Congress cannot supply:
“[T]he administrative separation of powers ensures that when the president
channels legislative-like responsibilities into the administrative domain,
inclusive, rivalrous, and heterogeneous governance perdures—and checks
and balances are preserved notwithstanding the apparent circumvention of
the constitutional separation of powers.”108
of power, it may in matter of fact be the means for the preservation of the content
of that doctrine.
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 46 (1938).
106. Metzger, supra note 20, at 87–91; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of
Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316–17
(2006) (“If major decisions are going to be made by the President, then how might separation of
powers be reflected within the executive branch? . . . A critical mechanism to promote internal
separation of powers is bureaucracy.”).
107. JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP 8–9 (2017) (“[W]ithin the administrative
arena, agency leaders stood in for the president . . . ; the tenured, expert civil service acted the part
of our independent and largely apolitical federal judiciary . . . ; and the public writ large (what I call
civil society) re-created Congress’s populist, pluralistic, and cacophonic deliberative role . . . .”);
see id. at 59–77 (elaborating this tripartite framework).
108. Id. at 150. These are not the first accounts to hybridize external and internal forms of
legitimacy. For example, the civic republicanism of the 1990s reimagined agency deliberation as a
broadly participatory process. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the
Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515, 1560 (1992) (arguing that “having
administrative agencies set government policy provides the best hope of implementing civic
republicanism’s call for deliberative decisionmaking informed by the values of the entire polity”
and that “the paradigmatic process for agency formulation of policy—informal rulemaking—is
specifically geared to advance the requirements of civic republican theory”); Note, Civic Republican
Administrative Theory: Bureaucrats as Deliberative Democrats, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1417
(1994) (“[C]ivic republican administrative theorists imaginatively reconstruct the evidence to find
republicanism alive and well in the informal rulemaking, administrative hearings, and staff
discussions that the national bureaucracy oversees daily. Rhetorically, civic republicanism attempts
to connect this reconstruction to a normatively attractive vision of highly participatory and
deliberative politics.”); cf. Jerry Frug, Administrative Democracy, 40 U. TORONTO L.J. 559, 580
(1990) (suggesting that public boards of directors, citizen groups chosen by lot, and ad hoc task
forces might be integrated into federal administration). A version of this argument appears today in
celebrations of notice-and-comment rulemaking, in particular as an externally facing form of agency
deliberative democracy, with the public at large speaking for itself rather than through representative
institutions. See generally Emerson, supra note 93, at 2081 (arguing that presidential direction of
the administrative state must be accompanied by participation by “the public at large” to “ensure its
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The internal-as-external account reflects the form of recent attacks on
the administrative state.109 It is a defense that responds to separation-ofpowers arguments by mirroring their structure. But merging the internal and
external in this manner risks undermining the force of each. Not only do
expertise, professionalism, and procedure appear nonresponsive to formal
constitutional arguments; they also sell short the particular logic of
administrative decisionmaking and the ways in which these values are
distinct from “electorally based representative government.”110 More
pertinent here, the internal turn paradoxically reinforces presidential power.
Expertise, procedure, and professional judgment may well tame presidential
power—indeed, they may complement it with more deliberative forms of
engagement—but they do not connect administration to representative
democracy.111 By abandoning other connections between agencies and
representative institutions, recent internal accounts leave the president as the
sole political representative authoring administrative policy.
III. Lost Roots
If we are living more than ever in an age of presidential administration,
so too do practice, doctrine, and theory alike reveal presidential control to be
an inadequate foundation for today’s administrative state. Courts may
embrace presidential control over agency actions only to hold that agencies
themselves cannot act, for example, or one president may rely on agencies to
set domestic policy only to see her decisions erased by her successor.
To more fully understand both the force and the limits of presidential
administration, we need to look beyond Washington. Once we bring the
states into view, presidential administration appears still more potent in key
respects: working together with the states, presidents have long realized
policy outcomes they could not achieve through federal agency action alone,
democratic legitimacy”); Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U.
L. REV. 519, 568 (2015) (“[P]ublic input into one of the most important forms of agency decisionmaking—notice-and-comment rulemaking—is derived from a process that is more deliberative than
majoritarian or special interest captured.”).
109. E.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 13 (2014); see also
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994).
110. Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
437, 459 (2003). See generally Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law:
Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 469–70 (2012) (arguing
that a “deliberative-constitutive paradigm” of administrative legitimacy focuses on expertise,
deliberation, and reason-giving as forms of “inside-out accountability”).
111. See, e.g., Rahman, supra note 10, at 1704 (“We cannot expect the administrative process
to by itself do all the moral and political work of catalyzing, sustaining, channeling, and ultimately
legitimizing political contestation and policy outcomes. At some point, we have to look to our
broader democratic ecosystem . . . .”); Stewart, supra note 110, at 459 (describing the disconnect
between administration and electorally based representative government); cf. Kagan, supra note 17,
at 2353 (“[A]gency experts have neither democratic warrant nor special competence to make the
value judgments—the essentially political choices—that underlie most administrative
policymaking.”).
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and such policies outlive their administrations. But states also introduce new
connections between administration and representative democracy: when the
president establishes policy in conjunction with state governments, she is no
longer the only elected official in the administrative domain.
Although twenty-first century political polarization brings new urgency
to the state role, as the next Part explores, intergovernmental presidential
administration is longstanding. Scholars typically trace presidential
administration to the work of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s
Brownlow Committee, which “established the infrastructure underlying all
subsequent attempts by the White House to supervise administrative
policy.”112 A number of the Committee’s arguments are familiar touchstones,
particularly its suggestion that presidential control was a response to the
“headless ‘fourth branch’”113 and its insistence that a powerful executive was
essential to, rather than a threat to, democratic government.114
Complementing these arguments was a set of claims grounded in
territory: the Committee relied on federalism, localism, and regionalism to
make its case for presidential control over administration. First, consistent
with then-emerging premises of cooperative federalism, the Brownlow
Committee recognized that even a robust federal administration would lack
power to effectuate domestic policy on its own; it would have to collaborate
with the states to achieve certain ends. Administration would necessarily be
intergovernmental. Second, it proposed that the need to coordinate the work
of federal agencies both with one another and with state and local
administration required a stronger president. Administration would
necessarily be presidential. Finally, the Committee suggested that
geographical decentralization could furnish representative government
within the broad domain of the executive branch. Intergovernmental
presidential administration meant that the concentration of federal power in
the executive need not amount to “overcentralization.”115

112. E.g., Kagan, supra note 17, at 2275; see also, e.g., Sidney M. Milkis, Executive Power and
Political Parties: The Dilemmas of Scale in American Democracy, in THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
379, 392 (Joel D. Aberbach & Mark A. Peterson eds., 2005) (labeling the resulting 1939
Reorganization Act the “organic statute of the ‘modern presidency’”); Peri E. Arnold, The
Brownlow Committee, Regulation, and the Presidency: Seventy Years Later, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
1030, 1035 (2007) (“Seventy years after Roosevelt submitted the Brownlow Committee’s final
report to Congress, the new administrative order that the committee championed is ascendant, and
the committee’s goals for regulation have been achieved in principle.”).
113. BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 27, at 36.
114. Id. at 47 (“[T]he really imminent danger now is that our democracy . . . may be led by false
or mistaken guides to place their trust in weak and faltering inaction . . . . Strong executive
leadership is essential to democratic government today.”).
115. Id. at 26.
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The Brownlow Committee

To appreciate the Brownlow Committee’s territorial arguments requires
a brief note on the backstory of its work. President Roosevelt convened the
Committee to offer a plan with respect to “administrative management—the
organization for the performance of the duties imposed upon the President in
exercising the executive power vested in him by the Constitution of the
United States,”116 a task he understood to be of constitutional moment.117
Before creating the Brownlow Committee, however, Roosevelt had planned
to have the National Resources Committee (NRC)118 issue his executive

116. Id. at 2.
117. See SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARTIES 109 (1993) (“Soon after the
1936 election, FDR revealed that he viewed the Committee as a surrogate constitutional
convention.”). As Luther Gulick recounted:
[Roosevelt] said that since the election he had received a great many suggestions that
he move for a constitutional convention for the United States and observed that there
was no way of keeping such an affair from getting out of hand what with [Father]
Coughlin and other crackpots about. “But,” he said, “there is more than one way of
killing a cat, just as in the job I assigned you.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Luther Gulick’s notes from a November 1936 planning session
with FDR and Brownlow). Ultimately, after an initial reorganization plan died in Congress in 1938,
a less ambitious plan was adopted the following year. Reorganization Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 7619, §§ 1–12, 53 Stat. 561, 561–64, superseded by Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, §§ 901–
06, 80 Stat. 378, 394–96. Pursuant to this Act, President Roosevelt created the Executive Office of
the President, and he moved an expanded Bureau of the Budget (later to become OMB) to this office
from the Treasury Department. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, The President Presents Plan No. I to
Carry Out the Provisions of the Reorganization Act. Apr. 25, 1939, in 8 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 245, 249 (1941); Exec. Order No. 8248, 3 C.F.R. §§ 576,
577 (1938–1943). The reorganization also created the National Resources Planning Board, but this
vehicle for territorial, democratic planning was killed off by Congress in 1943 (shortly after it issued
a postwar plan that underwrote FDR’s proposed second Bill of Rights). Independent Offices
Appropriations Act of 1944, ch. 145, 57 Stat. 169, 170 (1943).
118. President Roosevelt created the National Resources Committee (first called the National
Planning Board and the National Resources Board) to offer a plan for addressing “the physical,
social, governmental, and economic aspects of public policies,” including questions of
intergovernmental coordination. Exec. Order No. 6777 (1934). The order stated:
The functions of the Board shall be to prepare and present to the President a
program and plan of procedure dealing with the physical, social, governmental,
and economic aspects of public policies . . . . The program and plan shall include
the coordination of projects of Federal, State, and local governments . . . .
Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 7065 (1935) (instructing the Committee to “consult and cooperate
with agencies of the Federal Government, with the States and municipalities or agencies thereof” to
make recommendations about the “planned development and use of land, water, and other national
resources”).The first incarnation of the National Resources Committee was the National Planning
Board, created by Harold Ickes pursuant to the National Industrial Recovery Act. In 1934, the
National Planning Board was replaced by the National Resources Board to include members of the
Cabinet, Exec. Order No. 6777 (1934), and in 1935, the National Resources Board became the
National Resources Committee, Exec. Order No. 7065 (1935). Ultimately, pursuant to the
Reorganization Act of 1939, FDR reconstituted the National Resources Committee as the National
Resources Planning Board, which persisted until Congress terminated it in 1943. See Independent
Offices Appropriations Act of 1944, ch. 145, 57 Stat. 169 (1943).
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reorganization plan.119 Although he ultimately committed the project to a
newly constituted group under his greater personal control, when Louis
Brownlow and his colleagues took up the question of administrative
management, they drew on the NRC’s work, especially its recently published
study of Regional Factors in National Planning and Development.120
Focusing on “important problems of planning and development which
overlap State lines or which require the use of combined Federal and State
powers,”121 Regional Factors responded to a burgeoning interstate
cooperation movement,122 to the federal government’s regional approach to
organizing federal agencies,123 and to concerns about sectional stress.124
Unsurprisingly, then, Regional Factors offered an account of administration
grounded in territory. The NRC treated both the vast area of the United States
and the constraints of constitutional federalism as primary considerations for
the rapidly developing administrative state. Although this territorial emphasis
was significantly muted in the subsequent Brownlow Report, it informed the
Committee’s understanding, as key passages reveal.
1. Administration as Intergovernmental Administration.—Reading the
Brownlow Report together with the NRC’s Regional Factors report
underscores, first, that administration was understood to involve both federal
and state activity—and that an ambitious president would need to collaborate
119. Barry D. Karl, The Constitution and Central Planning: The Third New Deal Revisited,
1988 SUP. CT. REV. 163, 182–83. In the end, the NRC and Brownlow Committee shared a member,
Charles Merriam, and Louis Brownlow had recommended Merriam, as well as Wesley Mitchell and
Frederic Delano, to serve on a proposed national planning board after Merriam and Mitchell had
completed their work on President Hoover’s Research Committee on Social Trends. Moreover, both
committees drew on work by some of the same scholars, including James Fesler.
120. NAT’L. RES. COMM., REGIONAL FACTORS IN NATIONAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
(1935) [hereinafter NRC REPORT]; see Karl, supra note 119, at 183 (“[T]he Brownlow Committee
proceeded to do its work, but building somewhat surreptitiously on a report issued by the planning
board in 1935 . . . entitled Regional Factors in National Planning and Development.”).
121. NRC REPORT, supra note 120, at iii.
122. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution—
A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 729 (1925) (“The imaginative adaptation of
the compact idea should add considerably to resources available to statesmen in the solution of
problems presented by the growing interdependence, social and economic, of groups of States
forming distinct regions.”).
123. A survey concluded in February 1935 found, for example, that seventy-four federal
agencies recognized the need for regional organization of administration, and because some used
multiple regional organizations, 108 different federal regional schemes were being deployed. NRC
REPORT, supra note 120, at 71; see also James W. Fesler, Federal Administrative Regions, 30 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 257, 259–60 (1936) (comparing federal regional schemes).
124. See, e.g., DONALD DAVIDSON, THE ATTACK ON LEVIATHAN: REGIONALISM AND
NATIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 59 (1938); HOWARD W. ODUM & HARRY ESTILL MOORE,
AMERICAN REGIONALISM 16 (1938); FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
SECTIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 40 (1932). See generally Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi,
Reviving Federal Regions, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1895, 1922–28 (2018) (discussing federal regionalism
in the 1920s–1940s); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Our Regionalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 394–415
(2018) (exploring how regionalism shaped the administrative state’s development).
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with the states to achieve his objectives. Along with their contemporaries,
members of the NRC and Brownlow Committee assumed that the
constitutional division of powers between the states and the federal
government limited what the latter could do on its own. But against a dual
federalism that insisted on more thoroughgoing separation, they described
the constitutional division of power as occasion for joint enterprise.125
Although “Government in the United States is frequently presented as a
conflict between the National Government and the States,” the NRC’s
opening statement of principles maintained, “there are many functions for
which coordinated action is required.”126 Solving public problems demanded
“a sharing of powers” among federal and state authorities,127 as the many
New Deal programs that relied on “Federal-State administration, and not . . .
national administrative agencies alone” recognized.128 Even as the report
urged a harmonious cooperative federalism, moreover, the authors described
sectional tensions and posited state and regional differentiation of federal
policy as a way to manage the nation’s internal divisions.129 Theirs was a
political as well as managerial project.
Although the Brownlow Committee was not similarly focused on
federalism and regionalism, its members likewise recognized that numerous
policy areas were reserved to the states and that cooperation was an
administrative imperative. In proposing a permanent National Resources
Board in the White House to “cooperate with departmental, State, and local
agencies,” the Committee argued that intergovernmental cooperation was
“one of the most valuable services rendered by a National Resources Board”
and that it would require “diplomacy and intelligent interest rather than . . .
legal authority and high command.”130 In its proposals to reorganize the
federal executive branch, the Committee likewise stressed the need to
125. See, e.g., NRC REPORT, supra note 120, at 183 (“Coordination of program-making . . . is
required because the division of powers between Federal, State, and local governments under the
Constitution of the United States, of the States, and the laws of both, prevents any one unit from
dealing comprehensively with many problems.”).
126. Id. at vii, 7 (endorsing “cooperation” of state and federal government in the “attack upon
problems whose solution requires the exercise of constitutional powers distributed among them”).
127. Id. at vii. See generally JANE PERRY CLARK, THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISM (1938)
(describing cooperative federalism); JAMES T. PATTERSON, THE NEW DEAL AND THE STATES
(1969) (same).
128. NRC REPORT, supra note 120, at 182–83.
129. See, e.g., id. at ix (“The rapid and drastic changes occurring in our national life necessarily
subject the Nation to heavy internal strains. . . . [A] series of interrelated regions, closely cooperating
with the Federal establishment, would tend to cement the union and to promote the national solution
of intersectional maladjustments.”); id. at ix, 8 (discussing Frederick Jackson Turner’s account of
sectionalism); DAVIDSON, supra note 124, at 59 (noting that the NRC Report was “amazing” as a
government publication because it took up “a systematic consideration of the taboo question of
sectional stress and conflict”).
130. BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 27, at 25–26; see also id. at 27 (calling for the National
Resources Board to be “provided with an annual appropriation, a considerable part of which should
be used for aiding the several States in the maintenance of their State planning boards”).
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improve the federal government’s “cooperat[ion] with State and local
governments in the conduct of its affairs.”131 The Brownlow Committee not
only recognized the necessity of intergovernmental coordination but also
appreciated that federalism might bolster its account of presidential power.
2. Intergovernmental Administration as Presidential Administration.—
Both the NRC and the Brownlow Committee cited the need for
intergovernmental coordination as an important justification for greater
presidential control over administration. In the NRC’s account:
The very profusion of governmental agencies may prevent there being
taken at any one point a total view of governmental policies relating
to a given community, State, or group of States . . . . The responsibility
of taking such a total view and formulating policies and objectives and
priorities that must flow from it is that of the President.132
Coordination problems that abounded in Washington alone were still more
numerous once state and federal programs had to be integrated across the
country. With a prefectorial logic, this areal coordination problem was met
with proposals to “concentrate responsibility in a single official,” who could
only be “the president of the United States.”133
The Brownlow Committee likewise invoked the need to coordinate
federal and state activity to make its case for presidential administration. The
report cited chaos in national planning given the varied activities of regional,
state, and local boards, and it called attention to regionally incongruent
approaches to administration by the federal government.134 The “109
different plans of geographical subdivision of the United States in use by the
various governmental agencies” exacerbated problems of coordination
among agencies that had “grown up without plan or design like the barns,
131. Id. at 30.
132. NRC REPORT, supra note 120, at 183. The report also states:
Nor should we forget the very heavy responsibility which is placed, in our
Government, upon the President and his colleagues in the formulating of
administrative policy. While one may say that he is exercising Federal power alone,
the fact is that every exercise of such power has its impact at local points somewhere
in the area of the United States.
Id. at 199.
133. Leonard D. White, Public Administration, in 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
440, 443–44 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1930); see id. (“As the variety, extent
and complexity of public administration developed, and its costs mounted, the need for coordination
and central direction became urgent.”); see also NRC REPORT, supra note 120, at 183 (arguing that
presidential coordination was required “because the allotment of duties and responsibilities among
national departments, among State departments, and among departments in local governments
requires coordinated action among them for dealing adequately with many problems”); cf. Daniel
J. Elazar, Is Federalism Compatible with Prefectorial Administration?, PUBLIUS, Spring 1981, at 3,
7 (“[I]t is the essence of the prefectorial approach that hierarchical decision making, executed
through a bureaucratic structure, should not only establish a chain-of-command but a power pyramid
which comes to a single point at the top.”).
134. BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 27, at 35.
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shacks, silos, tool sheds, and garages of an old farm.”135 To be sure, the
Brownlow Committee’s argument for enhanced presidential control over
administration did not depend on the challenge of intergovernmental
coordination; the challenges it perceived within the federal government itself
demanded a streamlined federal apparatus and a “responsible and effective
chief executive as the center of energy, direction, and administrative
management.”136 But the need for intergovernmental coordination reinforced
the argument for presidential control: the federal government had to be
reduced to a single point, capable of taking “an overall view,”137 in order to
interface effectively with other governments.
3. Decentralized Centralization.—If federalism bolstered the
coordination-based argument for presidential control over federal
administration, it also moderated the claim, suggesting that presidential
control need not amount to “overcentralization.”138 The NRC and Brownlow
Committee cited geographical decentralization as a way to preserve local
representation and even democratic responsiveness within a system of
presidential administration. State, local, and regional participation could,
they insisted, humanize a system that increasingly concentrated power in the
chief executive.
Both committees began from an assumption that the burgeoning federal
administrative state shifted power to the executive branch from Congress.139
This became most explicit in discussions of national planning, as the National
Resources Board was expressly intended to “emancipate national policy from
the inertia and parochialism of Congress.”140 Policymaking would
increasingly be the responsibility of the executive rather than the legislature.
The Brownlow Committee’s most direct response to the separation-ofpowers questions this raised came in the unconvincing statement that
administrative management would improve the “[a]ccountability of the

135. Id. at 29–30.
136. Id. at 2.
137. Id. at 26.
138. Id.
139. This was a trope of the day. See, e.g., White, supra note 133, at 442, 447 (noting concerns
that the executive branch was “trench[ing] on the traditional duties of legislatures and courts,” but
stating that “[a]dministration has come to such a varied, extensive and technical state that no body
of men deriving from a political environment, rapidly changing in personnel, meeting intermittently
and absorbed with pressing issues of public policy, can expect to act effectively as a board of
directors”).
140. MILKIS, supra note 117, at 129, 347 n.16 (quoting Notes of the Meeting of June 25, 1934
with the President, Papers of the National Resources Planning Board); see also Alan Brinkley, The
National Resources Planning Board and the Reconstruction of Planning, in THE AMERICAN
PLANNING TRADITION 173, 181 (Robert Fishman ed., 2000) (noting that the National Resources
Planning Board “served as a symbol to many members of Congress of their increasing irrelevance
to basic policymaking”).
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Executive to the Congress.”141 Adhering to the template of prior
reorganization committees, the suggestion that “a coherent executive branch
and responsible president are more easily held accountable by the legislature”
marked the only part of the report to “embrace[] a dichotomous view of
administration and politics.”142
But if the authors of the Brownlow Report did not seem persuaded by
this particular argument, they worried aloud about “autocracy”143 and
“overcentralization.”144 What might counteract “excessive centralization” in
an executive-centric government? Not the bureaucracy, certainly. In contrast
to James Landis’s subsequent account,145 Brownlow and his colleagues were
hostile to a “headless ‘fourth branch’”; they posited bureaucracy itself as a
“dictatorial” threat.146
Instead, they suggested, territorial decentralization was the appropriate
“democratic” response to the consolidation of executive power.147 Neither the
NRC nor the Brownlow Committee equated decentralization with federalism
as such. They proposed that regional field offices of federal agencies would
allow government to “be carried to the people . . . to make it fit their needs”
and “to keep it from becoming distant and bureaucratic.”148 This sort of
argument was potentially more radical than relying on the states: Congress,
not the executive branch, was organized by area and constituted to represent
state, local, and regional interests within the federal government, but these
reports posited the executive branch as a territorial as well as functional
creature. Reliance on federal regions only went so far, however. The
committees argued not simply that regional units would bring the federal
141. BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 27, at 43–44.
142. PERI E. ARNOLD, MAKING THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY 106 (2d ed. 1998).
143. BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 27, at 47.
144. Id. at 26. Notably, the Brownlow Report was published the winter after the three members
of the Committee—Louis Brownlow, Charles Merriam, and Luther Gulick—and other publicadministration scholars had traveled to Europe and met with Hitler. In the years leading up to that
meeting, they had justified cooperation with the Nazi government in Germany by insisting on a
separation between administration and politics, but after the summer of 1936, they rejected their
prior view that the two could be neatly separated, and passages in the Brownlow Report were
intended to defend democracy against fascism. See Alasdair Roberts, Shaking Hands with Hitler:
The Politics-Administration Dichotomy and Engagement with Fascism, 79 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 267,
273 (2019).
145. See LANDIS, supra note 105.
146. BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 27, at 30 (“The safeguarding of the citizen from narrowminded and dictatorial bureaucratic interference and control is one of the primary obligations of
democratic government.”).
147. Id. at 36.
148. Id. Although Merriam disclaimed reliance on the academic studies he called
“nonsupporting documents,” this argument was consistent with a suggestion in James Fesler’s study
of the field service: that the real concern about expanded federal power was about the “centralized
regimentation of the remotest hamlet by an unsympathetic bureaucracy” and that “humanizing
Federal administration” and “orienting it with reference to the citizenry that it is intended to serve”
might generate greater acceptance of national policymaking. James W. Fesler, Executive
Management and the Federal Field Service, in BROWNLOW REPORT app. 277.
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government “nearer to the people themselves” but also that they would allow
the federal government to “better cooperate with State and local governments
in the conduct of its affairs.”149
It was in this return to cooperative federalism that the Brownlow
Committee tried to strike a balance between centralization and
decentralization. The federal executive branch would set national policy, but
that national policy might in turn be geographically differentiated in the
course of administration. Ultimately, the NRC and Brownlow Committees
proposed, presidential superintendence could mark the diminishment of
congressional authority, but the very interests Congress represented might be
advanced through cooperative federalism and regional administration.
B.

Reprising the Argument
Each of the Brownlow Committee’s claims—that administration had an
ineluctably intergovernmental dimension; that this intergovernmental
dimension bolstered the case for presidential control; and that incorporating
states, localities, and regions into federal administration might decentralize
and humanize executive-centric government—echoed across the twentieth
century. Some thirteen years after the Brownlow Report, for example, the
Hoover Commission linked intergovernmental relations and executive
power. Noting that “a very large part of the executive and administrative task
of the Federal government is concerned with problems, functions, and
services involving Federal-State relations,” the Commission argued that
intergovernmental relations demanded stronger presidential control over
federal administration.150
In the 1960s, the Great Society and expansion of federal funds flowing
to states meant that the “President was increasingly staking his reputation in
domestic affairs on the success or failure of new grant-in-aid programs.”151
In response to this development, task forces established by Presidents
Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon relied on decentralization and
devolution to argue for greater presidential control. The Heineman Task

149. BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 27, at 30.
150. U.S. COMM’N ON ORG. OF THE EXEC. BRANCH OF THE GOV’T, THE HOOVER COMMISSION
REPORT 495 (1949). In dissent, Dean Acheson and James Forrestal argued that the Commission was
exceeding its jurisdiction: established to make recommendations about the executive branch, it was
exploring state–federal relations, including grants-in-aid, which lay “in the realm of legislative
policy.” Id. at 25 n.1. That cooperative federalism was to be overseen by Congress rather than the
president was, however, precisely what the majority of commissioners disputed.
151. Gary Bombardier, The Managerial Function of OMB: Intergovernmental Relations as a
Test Case, 23 PUB. POL’Y 317, 321–22 (1975). As the President was “drawn into the
intergovernmental thicket,” he and his staff interacted directly with state and local “political leaders
who [were] not always willing to accept the decisions of the President’s administrative subordinates
in the executive departments.” Allen Schick, The Budget Bureau that Was: Thoughts on the Rise,
Decline, and Future of a Presidential Agency, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 519, 538 (1970);
Bombardier, supra at 322.
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Force called for greater presidential staff and machinery “to control and pull
together the related programs of Federal departments in Washington and in
the field . . . [and] to reflect the Presidential perspective in program areas
requiring cooperation between Federal agencies and between the Federal,
State, and local governments.”152 It also echoed the Brownlow Committee’s
appeal to centralized decentralization, suggesting that “far more
decentralization of operational program decisions is essential, subject to
precise policy guidance from Washington.”153
Nixon’s Ash Council similarly cited the complexity of
intergovernmental relations to justify presidential control. Consistent with
the broader agenda of New Federalism “to decentralize major domestic
decisionmaking activities from the Washington, D.C., level to federal
regional agencies and to the states and local governments,”154 the Ash
Council emphasized geographical decentralization—but at the expense of
congressional and agency, not presidential, power.155 As Nixon put it,
“Bringing power to the White House was necessary to dish it out.”156
Decentralization and the “administrative presidency”157 went hand in hand,
as the president sought to exercise power through a “vertical alliance”
running from the White House to “statehouses and city halls.”158

152. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON GOV’T ORG., THE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF
GREAT SOCIETY PROGRAMS 2, 4, 7 (1967) (Indiana University Libraries) (on file with author); see
also id. at 4, 7 (proposing a new Office of Program Coordination that would exist alongside the
Bureau of the Budget in the Executive Office of the President but also have a “field force organized
in ten Federal regions” intended “to reflect the President’s perspective, concerns, and desires in
program areas requiring cooperation between two or more Federal agencies, and State and local
governments”).
153. Id. Compare BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 27, at 30 (proposing “decentralizing the
actual administrative operation” after “so centralizing the determination of administrative policy
that there is a clear line of conduct laid down for all officialdom to follow”).
154. AM. SOC’Y FOR PUB. ADMIN., THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NEW FEDERALISM:
OBJECTIVES AND ISSUES 3 (1973).
155. See ARNOLD, supra note 142, at 292–93 (“The political context within which the Ash
Council formulated its views favored devolution. . . . But the clearly higher objective for the council
was to make federal activities at local and regional levels conform to national (read ‘presidential’)
priorities.”).
156. MILKIS, supra note 117, at 227 (quoting Nixon). Leonard Garment, who served on Nixon’s
White House legal staff, elaborated: “[T]he central paradox of the Nixon administration was that in
order to reduce federal power, it was first necessary to increase presidential power.” Id. (quoting
Garment). “Nixon felt . . . only a very strong president could ‘reverse the flow of power from the
states and communities to Washington.’ Accordingly, his commitment to decentralization went
hand in hand with a program of administrative reform that would help him accomplish his policy
goals by executive fiat.” Id. (quoting Garment).
157. RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (1983).
158. MARTHA A. DERTHICK, BETWEEN STATE AND NATION: REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES 180 (1974); see also Herbert Kaufman, Administrative Decentralization and
Political Power, 29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 3, 8 (1969) (considering how “decentralization” when
“characterized as organization by area as opposed to the present almost exclusive organization by
functional departments and bureaus” may strengthen central authority).
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IV. The President and the States
Although the overlap of state and federal policy domains has long led
presidents to engage with the states, and presidential task forces have
repeatedly emphasized states’ significance to questions of executive power
and administrative management, contemporary accounts of presidential
administration attend almost exclusively to federal agencies. In so doing, they
neglect some of presidents’ most effective tools for setting domestic policy,
from waivers and grants to nonpreemption of state law. They also neglect an
important source of durability: state policies may outlast any president’s
tenure, conferring resilience that federal agency action frequently lacks.
Incorporating the states into understandings of presidential
administration reveals not only additional resources for presidential
policymaking, however, but also a set of actors who may oppose the
president’s choices. If congenial state policymaking extends the president’s
reach, antagonistic state policymaking limits it at the same time. Consistent
with the Brownlow Committee’s suggestion, intergovernmental presidential
administration calls for more nuanced conceptions of centralization and
decentralization alike. States may help realize a president’s policy agenda
and supply a justification for greater presidential supervision of federal
administration, but so too do states diversify administrative policy and
broaden the representative base for administrative action beyond the
president herself.
A.

Federalism as a Tool of Presidential Administration

1. Beyond Centralization and Politicization.—Especially given
federalism’s role in formative accounts of presidential administration, we
might expect it to feature as well in the contemporary literature. Why then do
states figure marginally at best?159 Beyond disciplinary conventions that may
lead administrative law scholars to study only federal institutions, the most
likely reason is that states lie outside any plausible chain of command:
presidents cannot demand that states carry out federal programs, submit state
legislation to OIRA review, or the like.160 And states are not themselves

159. A notable exception is Thomas Gais & James Fossett, Federalism and the Executive
Branch, in THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, supra note 112, at 486, 502, 515 (arguing that devolution may
enhance federal executive power and that “control over the presidency and a few governorships can
be a sufficient base to launch important policy innovations”).
160. See, e.g., Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475 (2018) (“The anticommandeering
doctrine . . . is simply the expression of a fundamental structural decision incorporated into the
Constitution, i.e., the decision to withhold from Congress the power to issue orders directly to the
States.”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“The Federal Government may neither
issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’
officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (“The Federal Government may
not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory scheme.”).
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federal agencies, however much they participate in federal administration.
Thus, on Kagan’s centralization-focused account, it would be odd to regard
state policymaking as an aspect of presidential administration rather than a
distinct, if sometimes complementary, form of governance.161
Even in Washington, however, presidential administration relies as
much on politicization and agency officials who willingly align their
policymaking with the president’s agenda as on centralization that brings
decisions to the White House.162 If presidential administration need not
depend on command but may be furthered through willing partnerships, state
and local officials begin to look more similar to federal officials. States and
the federal government regulate largely overlapping policy domains, and
state and federal actors are closely linked both ideologically and
organizationally through national political parties.163 Political polarization
both dampens the significance of hierarchical control in Washington and
facilitates presidential administration beyond Washington.
If polarization underscores that intergovernmental coordination may be
a technique of presidential administration, it also underscores why presidents
would be particularly eager for state inputs: they require policymaking
capacity beyond that available in federal agencies to carry out their agendas.
Commentators often attribute the urgency of contemporary presidential
administration to partisan polarization and divided government, which make
legislative accomplishment difficult. But when presidents look beyond
Congress to federal agencies to achieve their objectives, they may still come
up short, or at least arguably so. The most significant challenges to executive
action in recent years have not alleged that the president was overreaching
vis-à-vis federal agencies; they have argued that federal agencies lacked
authority to carry out presidentially instigated actions. This—not limits on
presidential direction of agencies—was the story of President Obama’s major
initiatives, from the Clean Power Plan to DAPA and DACA, and more.164
Rapidly eclipsing the question of whether the president can control federal
agencies is the question of whether these agencies can act.
161. Although she did not consider state policymaking to be a tool of presidential
administration, Kagan did note that many examples of Clinton’s presidential administration
involved “the incorporation of state and local actors into the sphere of federal administration.”
Kagan, supra note 17, at 2306–07; see also infra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (describing
examples of intergovernmental presidential administration in Kagan’s account).
162. See supra subpart I(B).
163. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077,
1082–108 (2014) (discussing the effects of partisan politics on state and federal government).
164. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam, 136
S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (enjoining DAPA and expansion of DACA); Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (vacating antidiscrimination and antiblocking requirements of FCC’s 2010 Open
Internet Order); Opening Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues at 80–81, West Virginia v. U.S.
EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2016) (challenging Clean Power Plan). See generally Daphna
Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 213 (2015) (arguing that presidential “power to”
is a significant question alongside presidential “power over”).
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This question will only loom larger if the Supreme Court continues to
distinguish presidential power from administrative policymaking and to bless
the former while curtailing the latter.165 Indeed, if this doctrinal development
persists, a core question of past debates—whether the president is a “decider”
or only an “overseer” of agency action166—will recede in favor of the former
answer. But it will be an empty victory for those who see presidential
administration as part of a “pro-regulatory governing agenda.”167 A “decider”
role may give the president control over federal agencies, but that will be of
little use if courts deem these agencies’ resulting decisions beyond their
authority. Consideration of presidential administration must take into account
both the president’s relationship to federal agencies and the ability of these
agencies themselves to advance the president’s agenda.
Understanding presidential administration to involve the president’s
effectuation of a domestic policy agenda through administrative means—and
not simply the president’s control over federal agencies—returns us to early,
generative accounts of presidential administration. During the New Deal, the
constitutional division of power meant that a range of domestic policy areas
were understood to be reserved to the states. The NRC and Brownlow
Committee appreciated that the president had to rely on cooperative
federalism to achieve domestic policy objectives.168 The increase in grantsin-aid during the Great Society likewise required presidents to engage with
the states, as the Heineman Task Force and Ash Council explained.169 The
question of the president’s control over administration has long included both
the question of presidential control over federal agencies and the question of
presidential direction of federal policy more broadly, including in
conjunction with the states.
Today’s issue is less one of constitutional authority than the scope of
federal legislation: the necessity of “coordinated action”170 may not be
apparent because Congress in almost all cases could confer authority on
federal agencies. When a statute has not conferred such authority, however,
the consequences for federal administrative action are not so different from
a regime of dual federalism. Federal statutes that authorize federal agency
action may also confer distinct responsibilities on state actors, making

165. See supra subpart II(A).
166. See Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 719–38 (2007); cf. Cary Coglianese, The
Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential Control of the Administrative State, 69
ADMIN. L. REV. 43, 50, 69 (2017) (arguing that presidents already have numerous strategies to
effectively direct agencies’ work without violating purported decisional limits).
167. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2249.
168. See, e.g., supra Part III.
169. See, e.g., supra notes 151–58 and accompanying text.
170. NRC REPORT, supra note 120, at vii.
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cooperative federalism a statutory rather than constitutional imperative.171
Collaboration with the states thus remains an important way for presidents to
achieve policy objectives in the face of limited federal authority.
2. Examples and Techniques.—Once we look for the states in the
already-recognized domain of contemporary presidential administration,
they are ubiquitous. Indeed, it is curious that states have been all but absent
from the literature because they play an important role in Kagan’s own
account. Presidential Administration highlights two examples of the
phenomenon. One, the Department of Labor’s rule about paid parental leave,
relied expressly on states from the start: President Clinton directed the
Secretary of Labor “to issue a rule to allow States to offer paid leave to new
mothers and fathers,” and the final rule granted states the flexibility to use
unemployment insurance to provide such support.172 States were to be the
primary actors furthering the President’s vision; the federal agency was only
to facilitate state innovation.173
The second example—an FDA rule limiting the marketing and
advertising of tobacco to children174—had a subtler, but significant,
federalism dimension. After the FDA promulgated a rule consistent with the
President’s proclaimed objectives, the Supreme Court held that the rule
exceeded the agency’s statutory authority.175 Presidential administration,
understood solely as presidential direction of agency action, did not count for
much because the agency did not have authority to act. Yet the demise of the
federal rule did not mark the end of the policies it advocated: state and local
governments pursued the regulatory objectives Clinton had outlined until
Congress expressly conferred authority on the agency more than a decade
later.176 Provisions in the Master Settlement Agreement of 1998 and state
171. See, e.g., Bridget A. Fahey, Consent Procedures and American Federalism, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 1561, 1567 (2015) (noting that “federal-state collaboration” has become “the regulatory model
of choice for policy initiatives big and small,” and arguing that consent procedures mediate “the
power and influence of state and federal political actors”); Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National]
Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 1998 (2014) (“[F]ederalism now comes from federal statutes.”)
(emphasis omitted); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001) (“Congress continues to enact ‘cooperative
federalism’ regulatory programs that invite state agencies to implement federal law.”).
172. See Kagan, supra note 17, at 2284 (quoting Commencement Address at Grambling State
University in Grambling, Louisiana, 1 PUB. PAPERS 836, 839 (May 23, 1999)).
173. Subsequent presidents have continued to encourage states to develop programs rather than
construct a federal paid-leave program. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DOL FACTSHEET: PAID
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE (2015), https://www.dol.gov/wb/resources/paid_leave_fact
_sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D5Y-KAKR] (“The President’s 2016 budget will include more than
$2 billion in new funds to encourage States to develop paid family and medical leave programs.”).
174. See Kagan, supra note 17, at 2282–84.
175. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
176. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 3, 123 Stat.
1776, 1781 (2009); see Theodore W. Ruger, The Story of FDA v. Brown & Williamson: The Norm
of Agency Continuity, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 334, 337 (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. et al. eds., 2011).
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regulations restricting cigarette vending machines, smoking in public places,
advertising, and the like—rather than federal agency rules—constituted the
relevant “action to protect the young people of the United States from the
awful dangers of tobacco.”177
Other major initiatives of the Clinton Administration likewise joined
federal agency action with state initiative. For instance, Clinton and the
Department of Health and Human Services encouraged and granted waivers
that allowed states to depart substantially from existing requirements of the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.178 George W. Bush also
relied on intergovernmental collaboration when acting through
administrative means. For instance, his administration granted states waivers
to alter Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance programs, while his FaithBased Initiative sought to channel state and local social service contracts to
religious organizations.179
In the face of unyielding Republican opposition in Congress after his
first two years in office, Obama more extensively conjoined federal and state
administrative action. For example, he instructed the EPA to respond to
climate change with a new regulatory program that directly engaged “with
States, as they will play a central role in establishing and implementing
standards for existing power plants.”180 The resulting Clean Power Plan was
“based on” and intended to “reinforce the actions already being taken by
states.”181 The Obama Administration also used waivers and grants to
incentivize states to adopt educational standards in keeping with the federal
executive’s priorities,182 and it granted states waivers to achieve broader
participation in the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion and insurance

177. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2283 (quoting The President’s News Conference, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1237 (Aug. 10, 1995)); see, e.g., Master Settlement Agreement 29 (1998), https://www.naag.org
/assets/redesign/files/msa-tobacco/MSA.pdf [https://perma.cc/TUB7-T29U] (precluding settling
tobacco companies from opposing “state or local legislative proposals or administrative rules . . .
intended by their terms to reduce Youth access to, and the incidence of Youth consumption of,
Tobacco”); Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and
Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1224–36 (2014) (describing local tobacco regulation).
178. Clinton “estimated that 75 percent of AFDC recipients were involved in waivers” by the
time Congress enacted welfare reform. Gais & Fossett, supra note 159, at 508.
179. Id. at 509, 513.
180. Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, 78 Fed. Reg. 39535, 39536 (July 1, 2013).
181. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830, 34832 (proposed June 18, 2014) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60); see Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662, 64665 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (noting
that the Clean Power Plan is “designed to build on and reinforce progress by states, cities and
towns”).
182. See Martin A. Kurzweil, Disciplined Devolution and the New Education Federalism, 103
CALIF. L. REV. 565, 601–08 (2015); Overview Information; Race to the Top Fund Assessment
Program; Notice Inviting Applications for New Awards for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, 75 Fed. Reg.
18171, 18171 (Apr. 9, 2010).
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exchanges.183 In each of these cases, Obama superintended federal agency
action in a manner consistent with existing accounts of presidential
administration—he issued directives or instructions, for example, or claimed
ownership of agency policies—but the President and federal agencies alike
further depended on state policymaking. The Administration’s
environmental, education, and healthcare initiatives simply could not have
been achieved through federal agency action alone.184
The Trump Administration has continued to rely on state and local
policymaking. For instance, it has granted states waivers to impose work and
other requirements on Medicaid recipients.185 It has supported efforts by
states such as Texas to increase subnational participation in federal
immigration enforcement well beyond that required by federal law.186 And it
has issued a series of “Dear Governor” letters seeking to prompt state actions
undoing Obama Administration environmental and healthcare policies.187
These and other examples suggest that the catalog of tools commonly
associated with presidential administration is incomplete. Including both the
three techniques Kagan discussed (regulatory review, directives, and
appropriation), which sound in centralization, as well as techniques her
successors have studied, many of which sound in politicization, a list of
recognized techniques would be:
Regulatory Review. Presidents require agencies to submit any proposed
major regulation (and sometimes any significant guidance document) to

183. See John Dinan, Implementing Health Reform: Intergovernmental Bargaining and the
Affordable Care Act, 44 PUBLIUS 399, 411 (2014); Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is
Federalism in Healthcare For?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1730 (2018); Shanna Rose, Opting In,
Opting Out: The Politics of State Medicaid Expansion, 13 FORUM 63, 76 (2015).
184. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA.
L. REV. 953 (2016) (exploring and defending executive federalism as a form of joint state–federal
policymaking, with a focus on the Obama Administration).
185. See Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 Waivers by State,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaidwaiver-tracker-approved-and-pending-section-1115-waivers-by-state
[https://perma.cc/5LYDR569] (listing pending and approved Section 1115 waivers by state). But see, e.g., Stewart v. Azar,
366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 155–56 (D.D.C. 2019) (holding that Kentucky’s work requirement was
unlawful and vacating HHS’s approval).
186. E.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States of America in Support of Texas’s Motion
for a Stay Pending Appeal, City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-50762).
See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Preemption and Commandeering Without Congress, 70
STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2033–41 (2018) (describing state facilitation of and resistance to Obama and
Trump Administration policymaking).
187. E.g., Letter from Thomas E. Price, M.D., Sec’y, and Seema Verma, CMS Adm’r, U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Governor (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default
/files/sec-price-admin-verma-ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Q6Q-3B79]; Letter from Thomas E. Price,
M.D., Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Governor (Mar. 13, 2017), https://
www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/State-Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/March-132017-letter_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK95-CE7X]; Letter from E. Scott Pruitt, Adm’r, U.S. EPA,
to Matt Bevin, Governor of Ky. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201703/documents/ky_bevin.pdf [https://perma.cc/S45L-FVHP].
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OMB, which assesses the regulation under cost–benefit analysis and may
demand revisions of, delay, or reject proposed rules.188
Directives. Presidents issue memoranda to agency heads instructing
them to take certain actions that lie within their powers.189
Appropriation. Presidents publicly assert ownership of agency actions
through speeches, news conferences, social media, and the like.190
Appointments. Presidents appoint politically responsive actors to
positions in agencies.191
Czars. Presidents designate White House officials to oversee agency
policy in particular substantive areas.192
Enforcement. Presidents oversee agency enforcement activity.193

188. See Exec. Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982) (President Ronald Reagan); Exec. Order
No. 12866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) (President William Clinton); Exec. Order No. 13422, 3 C.F.R. 191
(2008) (President George W. Bush); Exec. Order No. 13563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012) (President Barack
Obama); Exec. Order No. 13777, 3 C.F.R. 293 (2017) (President Donald Trump); see, e.g., DeMuth
& Ginsburg, supra note 32, at 1076 (describing the emergence of White House regulatory review);
Kagan, supra note 17, at 2285–90 (comparing Clinton’s regulatory review with Reagan’s); Watts,
supra note 18, at 692–700 (describing reforms to regulatory review made by Bush and Obama).
OMB also reviews agencies’ annual regulatory plans, and it has sometimes used “prompt” and
“review” letters to shape the regulatory process in phases other than the proposed-to-final
rulemaking stage. See, e.g., Watts, supra note 18, at 694–95. Scholars continue to debate whether
OMB review is best understood as a form of presidential control. See supra note 35.
189. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 17, at 2290–99; Watts, supra note 18, at 691–703; Farber,
supra note 18, at 23–25.
190. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 17, at 2299–303 (describing Clinton’s practice of publicly
asserting ownership over agency action); Watts, supra note 18, at 703–04 (discussing Obama’s
practice of public appropriation through online media). Appropriation both contributes to the
president’s ability to shape administrative action and colors public perceptions about presidential
control over agencies. See Coglianese & Firth, supra note 59, at 1904 (considering public
perceptions).
191. See, e.g., Moe, supra note 35, at 245 (describing the power of appointment as “perhaps
more important than any other [the president] possesses”); see also, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 51, at
7; Barron, supra note 51, at 1096; Livermore, supra note 55, at 49; Moe & Wilson, supra note 51,
at 18.
192. See, e.g., Saiger, supra note 57; Watts, supra note 18, at 704–05. President Obama in
particular relied on czars to coordinate policy in areas such as energy and the environment, health
care, and auto recovery. The early months of President Trump’s administration suggested a twist on
this strategy, with presidential loyalists installed in federal agencies to monitor agency heads as a
“shadow cabinet,” although this effort was short-lived. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald et al., Trump
Starts Dismantling His Shadow Cabinet, POLITICO (May 1, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story
/2017/05/01/trump-starts-dismantling-his-shadow-cabinet-237819
[https://perma.cc/2W5U2Q2B].
193. See Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1124
(2013) (calling attention to the significance of the president’s role in administrative enforcement
and arguing for greater presidential coordination of agency enforcement). If the first round of
literature on presidential control over administration focused on executive branch organization and
the second focused on rulemaking, see, e.g., SEIDMAN, supra note 31, at 103, recent accounts,
including Professor Andrias’s, reflect a shift in agency policymaking away from notice-andcomment rulemaking to other tools, including guidance and enforcement policy.
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Budget. OMB prepares the president’s budget and oversees agencies’
execution of the budget.194
Pooling. Presidents integrate legal and policy resources dispersed across
multiple agencies to achieve desired ends.195
These are important techniques by which presidents shape federal
agency action, but they are not the only ones. Moreover, they are useful only
insofar as federal agencies already possess authority to advance the
president’s policy ends. If agencies lack statutory authority to promulgate a
certain rule, for example, it is of no moment that the president may direct
them to do so (or review or personally appropriate their activity).196
Especially given the emerging judicial skepticism of agency action, limits on
the president’s “power to” may be more significant than those on her “power
over.”197
It is here that states come squarely into view. Intergovernmental
cooperation expands the field for presidential administration through the
following tools198:
Waivers. Presidents and federal agencies exempt states from particular
statutory or regulatory requirements or allow states to substitute their own
policy choices.199 (For example, Clinton’s welfare waivers.200)

194. See Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125
YALE L.J. 2182, 2211–14 (2016) (exploring how the White House is able to control agency
policymaking through OMB’s preparation of the budget, oversight of agency execution of the
budget, and creation of various management initiatives through the budget process).
195. Renan, supra note 164, at 244 (arguing that, although agencies may also combine resources
on their own, presidents have “both the incentives and the institutional capabilities to nurture
pooling”); see also Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1174 (2012) (exploring “the President’s special burden, heightened
incentive, and unique capacity to spur [interagency] coordination specifically through centralized
supervision”); Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 224 (2013)
(“[I]nteragency administration can be a boon for executive power.”).
196. See, e.g., supra notes 172–77, 180–84 and accompanying text (discussing administrative
policies of Presidents Clinton and Obama that could not be implemented by federal agencies alone).
197. See Renan, supra note 164, at 213.
198. For discussions of techniques presidents use to influence state policymaking, see generally
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Gillian Metzger, The President and the States: Patterns of Contestation
and Collaboration Under Obama, 46 PUBLIUS 308, 314, 320–25 (2016), and Gais & Fossett, supra
note 159.
199. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Metzger, supra note 198, at 315–18; Gais & Fossett, supra note
159, at 508–11; Bryan Shelly, The Bigger They Are: Cross-State Variation in Federal Education
and Medicaid Waivers, 1991–2008, 43 PUBLIUS 452, 452–55 (2013); Frank J. Thompson &
Courtney Burke, Executive Federalism and Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: Implications for
Policy and Democratic Process, 32 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 971 (2007); see also David J.
Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 267 (2013)
(defending delegation of power to agencies “to unmake law Congress has made”).
200. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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Grants. Presidents and federal agencies offer financial incentives to
induce states to adopt particular policies.201 (For example, Obama’s Race to
the Top program that granted states funds to overhaul their education systems
consistent with Administration priorities.202)
Rulemaking Incorporation. Presidents and federal agencies adopt
regulations that build state law or policy into federal rules.203 (For example,
the Clean Power Plan that incorporated state and regional cap-and-trade
plans.204)
Nonpreemption. Presidents and federal agencies permit state law to
stand in areas also regulated by federal law.205 (For example, the Trump
Administration’s decision not to challenge certain state immigration laws and
to defend these state laws against other parties’ preemption challenges.206)
Nonenforcement. Presidents and federal agencies decide not to enforce,
or to reduce enforcement of, federal law based on conflicting state law.207
(For example, the Obama Administration’s decision to minimize
enforcement of federal law with respect to marijuana in states that had
legalized the drug.208)

201. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Metzger, supra note 198, at 317–19; Valentino Larcinese et al.,
Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to the States: The Impact of the President, 68 J. POL. 447 (2006);
Sean Nicholson-Crotty, Leaving Money on the Table: Learning from Recent Refusals of Federal
Grants in the American States, 42 PUBLIUS 449 (2012).
202. See supra note 182 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Paul Manna & Laura L. Ryan,
Competitive Grants and Educational Federalism: President Obama’s Race to the Top Program in
Theory and Practice, 41 PUBLIUS 522 (2011).
203. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Helen Levy, Essential Health Benefits and the Affordable
Care Act: Law and Process, 39 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 441 (2014); Bulman-Pozen &
Metzger, supra note 198, at 321–22.
204. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen, supra note 184, at 1024–25; Memorandum from the White House
for the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (May 20, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov
/realitycheck/the_press_office/Presidential-Memorandum-Regarding-Preemption [https://perma.cc
/PCY3-R5AU] (“The purpose of this memorandum is to state the general policy of my
Administration that preemption of State law by executive departments and agencies should be
undertaken only with full consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a
sufficient legal basis for preemption.”).
206. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. In contrast, the Obama Administration
challenged Arizona’s immigration law, and the Supreme Court held much of the state law
preempted. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012).
207. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Metzger, supra note 198, at 324–25; Cristina M. Rodríguez,
Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J.
2094, 2107 (2014).
208. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., for All U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29,
2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc
/88G7-QP38]; Bulman-Pozen, supra note 184, at 980–82.

BULMAN-POZEN.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

Administrative States

12/21/2019 12:47 PM

307

Encouragement. Presidents and federal agencies prod the adoption of
congenial policies as state law.209 (For example, Obama’s push to expand the
minimum wage as a matter of state law.210)
Not all concordant state and federal policymaking should be regarded
as a form of presidential administration, as the “encouragement” category,
especially, might suggest. The simple fact that a state adopts a policy favored
by the president is not sufficient reason to attribute that policy to the
president, but negotiations and other interactions between the state and the
federal executive can make the case.
These various tools—waiver, grants, rulemaking, nonpreemption,
nonenforcement, and encouragement—expand the reach of presidential
administration. Their exercise generally involves presidential direction of
federal agencies; for instance, the president might instruct the Department of
Health and Human Services to give a state a waiver, she might work with the
Department of Education to confer grants on particular states, or she might
use White House czars to interact directly with state officials. But by
collaborating with states, presidents achieve ends they cannot through federal
agency action alone. Especially as presidents confront judicially imposed
limits on federal agency action, intergovernmental presidential
administration is likely to become even more prominent in shaping domestic
policy.
B.

An Ambivalent Tool

Has federalism become simply one more tool of presidential control in
an executive-dominant system? Looking only at presidential initiation of
intergovernmental collaboration may yield that conclusion: presidents reach
out to friendly states when they cannot achieve desired ends through new
legislation or purely federal administrative action.211 As the NRC and
Brownlow Committees suggested, however, presidential reliance on the
states is not purely president-aggrandizing; decentralization may be both a
strategy for and also an antidote to the concentration of executive power.
209. See, e.g., Thomas Kalil, Policy Entrepreneurship at the White House: Getting Things Done
in Large Organizations, 11 INNOVATIONS 4, 11 (2017) (describing the Obama Administration’s use
of a “call to action” to enlist states to help the Administration meet policy goals); Gregory Korte,
To Get Around Congress, Obama Turns to City Halls, USA TODAY (May 26, 2015, 8:34 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/05/25/obama-state-and-local-strategy
/27602149/ [https://perma.cc/284A-YVXU].
210. See, e.g., Michael A. Memoli, Democratic Governors Join Obama in Push for Higher
Minimum Wage, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/21
/news/la-pn-obama-governors-minimum-wage20140221 [https://perma.cc/XB4L-569V].
211. Indeed, such collaborations may not only increase presidential power in Washington but
also enhance federal control over state and local governments. See generally James W. Fesler,
Approaches to the Understanding of Decentralization, 27 J. POL. 536, 565 (1965)
(“Decentralization from a national government to a provincial government or regional
administrative office may actually tighten centralized controls over local governments and district
administrative offices.”); Gais & Fossett, supra note 159, at 515–16.
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Federalism enhances presidential policymaking capacity in a different
manner from many other capacity-building strategies. It depends on a cadre
of actors with their own constituencies, electoral responsibilities, and
pluralism of viewpoints.212 Presidential reliance on state policymaking and
implementation to effectuate a domestic agenda empowers independent
actors within the administrative realm.
Even when presidents affirmatively seek state cooperation, the resulting
state action is therefore often not entirely in line with their interests. Copartisans who share high-level goals may disagree about the particulars, and
states may possess constitutional or statutory entitlements, or political rather
than strictly legal powers, that give them leverage when the president seeks
to enlist their help. The Obama Administration’s negotiations with states
about expanding Medicaid coverage in the wake of NFIB v. Sebelius213
furnish a high-profile illustration of how state–federal interactions may be
more mutual than a top-down account of presidential administration
suggests.214 Lower profile negotiations are pervasive.215
Moreover, states do not participate in federal administration only at the
invitation of the current president. Sometimes they are carrying out parts of
a federal statutory regime at Congress’s invitation.216 Sometimes they are
engaged in their own independent policymaking in a space also occupied by
the federal government. Sometimes they are continuing an administrative
program designed by a prior president. As that last possibility indicates, states
do not support or oppose presidential policy as a general matter; they support
or oppose particular presidents and particular policies. Just as the president
is best conceptualized as a political location rather than an individual, so too

212. Notably this is a point about state and local governments as such—not federal
administrative regions, which the NRC and Brownlow Committee relied on for their decentralized
vision. Although federal regions may continue to diversify administrative policy and to insulate
certain decisions from presidential control, they are relatively obscure components of government
that lack forms of independence and the representative connection to the people possessed by the
states themselves. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity,
Distinctiveness, and Political Culture in the American Federal System 111 (Feb. 24, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6121&
context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/6NA3-TZNU] (arguing that the “cultural salience”
of administrative regions is “approximately zero”). Even as it hoped that planning regions might
elicit a regional consciousness, the NRC itself appreciated in the 1930s that “no Californian ever
boasted of living within the Twelfth Federal Reserve District; no Washingtonian of being a resident
of the Fourth Procurement Zone.” NRC REPORT, supra note 120, at 157.
213. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
214. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 59, at 1772–86.
215. See ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 280 (2011) (noting the
pervasiveness of state–federal bargaining).
216. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of
Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (2012) (describing how state administration of federal law can
constrain federal executive power).
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do state actors instantiate broader partisan and ideological commitments.217
In a two-party system, this means state opposition to one president will often
entail support for her predecessor or her successor.
1. Presidential Administrations.—Considering multiple presidential
administrations offers a useful lens on states’ role. For example, states that
were leading implementers of Obama’s initiatives now find themselves
defending those initiatives—and opposing Trump’s reversals.218 These states
have numerous ways to side with a prior administration against the current
one. Perhaps the most visible is litigation: state-led challenges to the federal
executive have become more prominent in the past decade, as red states
challenged Obama Administration policies and blue states have challenged
Trump Administration policies.219 When they litigate as separate sovereigns,
however, states tend to resemble private opponents of presidential policy;
they may have a distinct path into the courthouse, but their arguments could
be made by other plaintiffs as well.
States have a unique, and more powerful, position when they operate
within the administrative domain.220 For example, states may withhold their
cooperation from a new enforcement policy. If the federal government is
dependent on states to execute federal law, states may choose not to
accommodate any given administration’s priorities. In the past two years,
uncooperative states have limited the extent to which President Trump’s
rejection of President Obama’s immigration policies has been realized. At
the same time as Texas mandates broader state assistance to ICE than federal
law contemplates,221 California curtails its assistance and thereby limits the
217. See generally Bulman-Pozen, supra note 163 (explaining political actors’ use of both
national and state institutions to advance their partisan goals); see supra subpart I(B) and text
accompanying note 30.
218. See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L.
REV. 851 (2016); Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of
Polarization, 97 TEXAS L. REV. 43 (2018).
220. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism,
118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009) (exploring how states use regulatory power conferred by the federal
government to resist federal policy choices); Bulman-Pozen, supra note 216 (exploring how states
use regulatory power conferred by Congress to resist presidential choices, in particular); Jean
Galbraith, Cooperative and Uncooperative Foreign Affairs Federalism, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2131
(2017) (reviewing MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM:
THE MYTH OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY (2016)) (considering how states both enhance and
complicate the president’s foreign-affairs power); Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009
Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 33–44 (2010) (discussing
states’ “power of the servant”). Sometimes, state litigation itself depends on the state’s role in a
federal scheme. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism All the Way Up: State Standing
and “The New Process Federalism,” 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1739 (2017) (considering how states’
representative role in federal statutory schemes may confer standing to challenge the allocation and
exercise of authority in the federal government).
221. See Tex. S.B. 4, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (preventing local entities from prohibiting peace
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reach of federal enforcement in its borders.222 Even if Trump may direct the
activity of the relevant federal agencies, then, that alone is not sufficient to
control immigration policy. The federal executive branch relies on state
cooperation to achieve its objectives, but states’ legal and political
independence allows them to set the terms of their participation, including by
rejecting policy choices of the current administration.
Notably, although California and other “sanctuary” jurisdictions make
arguments sounding in state sovereignty to defend their policies against legal
challenge, their broader commitments echo the Obama Administration’s
deferred-action guidance. State and local governments, including California,
Massachusetts, and New York City, do not limit all cooperation with ICE;
instead, they train state resources on violent and other serious criminal
offenses as the Obama Administration’s policies sought to do.223
States may also keep a federal regulatory program disfavored by the
current president alive within their borders. Although the Trump
Administration has rescinded the Clean Power Plan,224 for example, a number
of states are continuing to comply with their obligations and to adopt new
commitments to renewable energy.225 This continuity is facilitated by the
Clean Power Plan’s own reliance on state efforts. Recognizing the role of
numerous states—most notably California and the northeastern states
participating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)—in
regulating greenhouse gas emissions, the Obama Administration
incorporated state efforts into the federal rule. Now, states are furthering
these efforts despite the rollback of the federal rule. State officials argue both
that they are resisting Trump’s agenda and that they are advancing policy
commitments they shared with the Obama Administration.226
officers from gathering information about an individual’s immigration status or detaining him or
her for immigration authorities).
222. See California Values Act, S.B. 54, 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2017) (prohibiting law
enforcement agencies from gathering information about a person’s immigration status or detaining
him or her for immigration authorities).
223. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7282.5, 7284.2(b)–(c), 7284.6 (West 2019). California and
other jurisdictions permit law enforcement officers to transfer individuals and share information
with federal agents if these individuals have been convicted of certain crimes. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T
CODE §§ 7282.5(a), 7284.6(a) (West 2019).
224. See Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units, 84 Fed. Reg. 32520 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60)
(July 8, 2019).
225. See supra note 12.
226. See, e.g., Statement from Governor Andrew M. Cuomo (Oct. 10, 2017), https://
www.governor.ny.gov/news/statement-governor-andrew-m-cuomo-162 [https://perma.cc/SE7Z5386] (“While the Trump Administration takes a back [] seat to the rest of the world, New York . . .
will continue to lead the fight to meet the standards set forth in both the Paris Accord and the Clean
Power Plan.”); see also State Reactions to Trump Repealing the Clean Power Plan, GEO. CLIMATE
CTR. (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.georgetownclimate.org/articles/state-reactions-to-trumprepealing-the-clean-power-plan.html [https://perma.cc/YWJ2-4GVE] (collecting similar statements
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In addition, states may reinstate now-disfavored federal policy as state
policy through their independent initiative. A number of states have codified
as state law versions of the net-neutrality policy the FCC adopted under
Obama and has withdrawn under Trump.227 Using repealed federal policy as
a guide, these states are actively seeking to “restore” the open-internet
protections.228 Florida and other states have likewise adopted offshore
drilling restrictions imposed by the Obama Administration and withdrawn
under Trump.229 California has codified the affirmatively furthering fair
housing policy adopted by Obama’s Department of Housing and Urban
Development and rescinded by Trump’s HUD.230 Nevada has reinstated the
Obama-era fiduciary rule through state legislation.231
As noted above, these state actions can fairly be understood as either an
extension of or a limitation on presidential policymaking—or, perhaps more
accurately, both at once. On the one hand, state legislative and executive
decisions provide durability that federal presidential administration lacks.
With President Obama out of office and federal agencies rescinding rules,
guidance, and the like, states may entrench presidential policies in a way
federal actors cannot. The oft-invoked rhetoric of “restoration” is apt,
particularly because states are self-consciously designing their own
legislation, rules, enforcement policies, and more with reference to prior
federal policies; they are not adopting entirely new policies so much as
shifting disavowed federal policies into state forms. On the other hand, the
same states that are providing an afterlife for Obama-era policies are actively
rejecting President Trump’s administrative decisions. If the rhetoric of
“restoration” applies, so too does the more popular rhetoric of “resistance.”
This dual character relates to a second key point: any given state might
be said to be extending a prior administration’s policies or opposing a current
administration’s policies, but there is not only one state. Some states can be
expected to support a particular president’s agenda, while others—

by state officials). See generally Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009) (arguing that interactions between the federal government and the
states have spurred regulatory innovation).
227. See supra notes 4, 6 & 15 and accompanying text.
228. Johnson, supra note 15.
229. E.g., FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7 (amended 2018); Assemb. B. 1775, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess.
(codified at CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6245 (West 2018)); S.B. 200, 149th Gen. Assemb., 2d Spec.
Sess. (codified at 81 Del. Laws § 442 (2018)); STOP Offshore Oil and Gas Act, Assemb. B. 839,
218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (codified at N.J. REV. STAT. § 13:19-47 to -51 (2018)).
230. Assemb. B. 686, 2017–2018 Sess., Reg. Sess. (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 8899.50,
65583, 65583.2 (West 2019)).
231. S.B. 383, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 628A.010, 628A.040,
688C.212 (West 2019)); see also John Manganaro, State-Based Fiduciary Regulations Take Shape
in 2019, PLAN ADVISOR (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.planadviser.com/exclusives/state-basedfiduciary-regulations-take-shape-2019/ [https://perma.cc/8NX6-SF5D] (describing how regulators
and legislators in numerous states are “pushing to fill a perceived void created by federal
deregulation”).
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principally those controlled by the opposite party—can be expected to oppose
this agenda. To be sure, the references to California throughout this
discussion are not a coincidence; some states are “more equal than others”
when it comes to regulatory capacity and influence.232 But there are more and
less powerful red and blue states alike. Texas will not agree with California;
Rhode Island will not agree with Alabama. The state role is necessarily
multivalent.
2. Courts and Congress.—The most apparent lesson to be gleaned from
recent practice is for presidents themselves: if a president wants her
regulatory preferences to outlast her administration, she should embrace
cooperation with, even reliance on, states as a vehicle for promoting policy
stability. The contours of intergovernmental presidential administration are
necessarily determined not only by states and the federal executive branch,
however, but also by other actors. In particular, state efforts to perpetuate or
restore federal policy—and, in so doing, to oppose the current president’s
administrative policies—are vulnerable to legal challenge and judicial
invalidation.
Recognizing risks of regulatory volatility, commentators have recently
called for courts to more closely scrutinize federal agencies’ policy reversals
pursuant to APA arbitrary-and-capricious review.233 But also important is the
space courts leave for states to act. When federal agencies change course, are
states prohibited from adhering to a previous policy or reinstating it as a
matter of state law? Existing doctrine already reserves some space for the
states. The anticommandeering principle, recently reaffirmed in Murphy v.
NCAA,234 prevents the federal executive branch from compelling states to
regulate in accord with its preferences.235 For example, sanctuary
jurisdictions need not lend support to federal immigration enforcement.236
232. See generally DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995) (describing the “California effect”).
233. See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Daniel Richardson, Administrative Law for an Era of
Partisan Volatility 34–37 (November 5, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3278745 [https://perma.cc/CXP5-NFQU] (suggesting that judicial scrutiny could help
“mitigate the costs of political instability”); see also Josh Blackman, Presidential
Maladministration, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 397, 405–08, 411, 413, 415–16, 422 (describing
presidential reversals as a species of maladministration that may warrant judicial skepticism).
234. 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
235. Id. at 1484–85 (holding unconstitutional a federal law banning state government
“authorization” of sports gambling under state law); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
236. See, e.g., New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 234–35 (S.D.N.Y.
2018); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 873 (N.D. Ill. 2018); City of Philadelphia
v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289, 329 (E.D. Pa. 2018), aff’d in relevant part, 916 F.3d 276, 279 (3d
Cir. 2019). See generally Spencer E. Amdur, The Right of Refusal: Immigration Enforcement and
the New Cooperative Federalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 87 (2016) (discussing state refusals to
assist federal immigration-enforcement efforts); Ilya Somin, Making Federalism Great Again: How
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Whether state policies reflect independent state judgment or an attempt to
advance a broader national commitment is of no moment; the federal
government may not “dragoon[]” states into “administering federal law”
regardless of the reasons states reject cooperation.237
More complicated questions arise with respect to preemption. Almost
immediately upon their enactment, for instance, the Trump Administration
argued that California’s immigration and net-neutrality laws were
preempted.238 On its logic, California could not adopt distinct policies from
the federal executive because federal law displaced contrary state
approaches. Beyond the limits anticommandeering doctrine itself sets on
such claims,239 courts should be wary of executive preemption—attempts to
displace state policymaking that come from the executive branch rather than
Congress.240 To be sure, the president and federal agencies will often defend
their decisions with reference to an underlying statute rather than autonomous
executive power; in challenging California, the Trump Administration has
cited the Communications Act, Immigration and Nationality Act, and other

the Trump Administration’s Attack on Sanctuary Cities Unintentionally Strengthened Judicial
Protection for State Autonomy, 97 TEXAS L. REV. 1247 (2019) (exploring litigation concerning state
refusals to cooperate with Trump immigration-enforcement efforts).
237. Printz, 521 U.S. at 928.
238. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, United States v. California,
No. 2:18-at-01539 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file
/1097306/download [https://perma.cc/C6L9-8A4K] (arguing that California’s net-neutrality law is
preempted); Complaint at 3, United States v. California, No. 2:18-cv-00490-JAM-KJN (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 6, 2018), 2018 WL 1181625 (arguing that California’s sanctuary-state law is preempted);
Brian Fung, California Agrees Not to Enforce Its Net Neutrality Law as Justice Dept. Puts Lawsuit
on Hold, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/10/26
/california-agrees-not-enforce-its-net-neutrality-law-trumps-doj-puts-its-lawsuit-hold/?utm
_term=.46ad24ad7a02 [https://perma.cc/PA6A-WHSS] (describing agreement that DOJ will
postpone litigation challenging California’s net-neutrality law and California will not enforce the
rules on broadband providers). But see Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, No. 18-1051, 2019 WL 4777860, at
*60, *62 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 1, 2019) (vacating the portion of the 2018 FCC Order purporting to preempt
any state or local requirements inconsistent with the FCC’s deregulatory approach but leaving open
the question whether particular state laws are preempted by other portions of the 2018 Order);
United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 894–95 (9th Cir. 2019) (rejecting, at preliminary
injunction stage, several arguments that California’s sanctuary-state law is preempted).
239. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen, supra note 186, at 2043–47 (exploring the intersection between
preemption and commandeering with respect to immigration policy).
240. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 695, 698–99 (2008); Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 870,
881 (2008). Executive nonpreemption—federal executive branch efforts to insulate state action
from preemption—is a different matter. Agencies should receive greater deference for
determinations that state law is not preempted than that it is. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 184, at
1023–25.
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federal statutes.241 But the critical preemptive decisions are coming from the
executive branch, not Congress.242
This is in substantial part because the most contentious executive branch
policymaking of recent years has concerned questions about which Congress
has not clearly spoken (e.g., climate change, net neutrality, parameters of
immigration enforcement).243 As some scholars have argued, it makes sense
to give federal agencies latitude to regulate in these areas; they are better
positioned than courts to answer new questions, so “it may be more
‘democratic’ to defer during fallow legislative periods to the agencies, rather
than revert to a judicially imposed and indefinite extension of the status
quo.”244 But to acknowledge this is simply to acknowledge the limits of
democratic inputs at the federal level. Bringing in the states offers a path
around some of these limits,245 a path courts can preserve by distinguishing
federal agency policymaking from federal agency latitude to preempt the
states.246
If intergovernmental presidential administration contains lessons for
presidents and the courts, it also speaks to Congress: the case against
preemption is particularly strong if Congress has expressly conferred
authority on the states as, for example, in the paradigmatic case of the Clean
Air Act. Indeed, the Bush and Trump Administrations’ attempts to deny
California Clean Air Act waivers have been some of the most egregious
examples of presidential unilateralism insofar as they seek to override a
specific statutory entitlement with executive diktat.247
241. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 238, at 2–3, 5 (arguing that California’s sanctuary-state
law is preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986, and other federal laws regulating immigration); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, supra note 238, at 1 (arguing that California’s net-neutrality law is preempted by the federal
Communications Act, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
242. Consistent with the argument here, courts have been skeptical of the Trump
Administration’s broadest preemption arguments. In particular, although the D.C. Circuit largely
upheld the FCC’s 2018 Order revoking net neutrality, it rejected the Order’s Preemption Directive
that would have prevented any state from imposing a requirement inconsistent with the FCC’s
“deregulatory approach.” Mozilla Corp., 2019 WL 4777860, at *50. The court reasoned that this
express Preemption Directive was not grounded in statutory authority. See id. at *54 (“[T]he power
to preempt the States’ laws must be conferred by Congress. It cannot be a mere byproduct of selfmade agency policy.”). The Ninth Circuit likewise rejected several of the Trump Administration’s
most sweeping arguments about preemption in the immigration context. See United States v.
California, 921 F.3d at 894–95 (affirming in part and reversing in part the district court’s partial
preliminary injunction against California’s sanctuary-state law).
243. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 93; Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New
Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014); Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law
Without Congress, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 501 (2015).
244. Freeman & Spence, supra note 243, at 76.
245. See infra Part V.
246. The D.C. Circuit’s recent decision concerning net neutrality draws just such a distinction.
See Mozilla Corp., 2019 WL 4777860, at *50; supra note 242.
247. See Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National
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The invocation of Congress here is necessarily limited. A premise of
intergovernmental presidential administration is that, although Congress may
retain paramount authority, it exercises it sparingly enough that the policy
domain is largely executive. Without positing federal lawmaking as a
solution to administration’s discontents, however, we must acknowledge its
role in shaping this executive domain. In particular, during periods of unified
party government, Congress often has two years to pass legislation broadly
setting parameters for future administrative governance. It may be tempting
when the next such window arises for ambitious members of Congress to
advocate unitary national solutions in various areas, from climate change to
healthcare. But instead of reflexively cutting out the states, senators and
representatives should be mindful of how future administrations may
undermine their objectives. If past is prologue, state discretion is more likely
to be championed by the detractors than proponents of any particular policy,
but delegating authority to both the federal executive branch and the states
can better secure proponents’ ambitions over time, including by allowing
states to keep alive and refine regulatory policies that a new federal
administration revokes.248
V.

Reconsidering Presidential Administration
Both New Deal theories of administration, forged as the United States
moved from a principally legislative to a principally executive order, and
developments in government practice and politics in the years since illustrate
the important role of the states. This Part returns to some contemporary
questions about presidential administration with this landscape more fully in
view. As Kagan argued in making her normative case, “All models of
administration must address two core issues: how to make administration
Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51310, 51328–61 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85–86)
(withdrawing the 2013 waiver of preemption of California’s Advanced Clean Car program);
California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver
of Clean Air Act Preemption, 73 Fed. Reg. 12156, 12159–64 (Mar. 6, 2008) (denying California a
waiver of preemption of emissions standards for new motor vehicles). A challenge to the Bush
EPA’s waiver denial was dismissed on the parties’ joint motion after the Obama EPA granted the
waiver. See California v. EPA, No. 08-1178 (D.C. Cir. May 5, 2008). A challenge to the Trump
EPA’s waiver revocation is pending. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
California v. Chao, Case No. 1:19-cv-02826 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2019), http://
blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents
/2019/20190920_docket-119-cv-02826_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9CW-PC95].
248. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate
Challenge, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1037, 1089, 1094–97 (arguing that retaining concurrent federal and
state authority can hedge risks of regulatory reversal and implementation failure); cf. Jacob E.
Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV.
201, 212 (“Giving authority to multiple agencies and allowing them to compete against each other
can bring policy closer to the preferences of Congress than would delegation to a single agent.”).
The prospects are better when the multiple agents are the states and the federal executive branch
rather than multiple federal agencies because federal agencies can be controlled by the president in
a way the states cannot.

BULMAN-POZEN.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

316

12/21/2019 12:47 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 98:265

accountable to the public and how to make administration efficient or
otherwise effective.”249 She contended that the presidential model fared
better than the alternatives. As presidential administration has grown
stronger, however, the already-tentative case for presidential direction of
administration has become increasingly fraught. “Accountability” and
“effectiveness,” in particular, may scan as more autocratic than
democratic.250 States’ role in both furthering and constraining presidential
direction of administration introduces salutary complexity. Intergovernmental presidential administration is superior to purely federal
presidential administration, even on the terms set by Kagan’s account.
A.

Accountability
Kagan’s principal defense of presidential administration sounded in
accountability to the public.251 While acknowledging that “responsiveness to
the general electorate” was not the only criterion by which to assess
administration,252 she argued that on this necessary-if-insufficient criterion,
presidential control was superior to its alternatives: as a unitary and visible
office, the presidency rendered administration more transparent,253 and as the
only official elected by a national constituency focused on national issues,
the president was “likely to consider, in setting the direction of administrative
policy on an ongoing basis, the preferences of the general public, rather than
merely parochial interests.”254 Compared to the president, she insisted, civil
servants, political appointees, interest groups, and members of congressional
committees had “a far more tenuous connection to national majoritarian
preferences and interests.”255
This account was controversial from the start. Some of the most
emphatic challenges focused on a plebiscitary account of presidential power,

249. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2331.
250. See PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE 143–74 (2009); Jud Mathews, Minimally
Democratic Administrative Law, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 605, 633–34 (2016).
251. “Accountability” bears many different meanings. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw,
Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006)
(presenting a partial taxonomy). This discussion follows Kagan’s focus on electoral accountability.
252. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2336.
253. Id. at 2332–33.
254. Id. at 2335. Kagan recognized that this responsiveness argument might be retrospective as
well as prospective—i.e., as the only official elected by a national constituency focused on national
issues, the president might be understood to have a mandate, at least with respect to salient issues.
See id. at 2334–35. But she appeared at best ambivalent about the retrospective version of the
argument, insisting instead on the force of the prospective claim. See id. at 2334. (“[E]ven assuming
a popular majority for a presidential candidate, bare election results rarely provide conclusive
grounds to infer similar support for even that candidate’s most important positions, much less the
sometimes arcane aspects of regulatory policy. Presidential claims of prior public validation indeed
often have a tinny timbre.”).
255. Id. at 2336.
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which Kagan had attempted to distinguish.256 The risks such commentators
recognized of grounding administrative legitimacy in a single election have
only grown starker: like George W. Bush before him, Trump does not even
possess whatever mandate may follow from winning the popular vote.257
More problematic for Kagan’s prospective account, Trump has not sought to
further “the preferences of the general public” after assuming office.258 To
the contrary, his administration illustrates the potential conflation of
presidentialism and authoritarianism,259 as well as of “national majoritarian
preferences” and white-nationalist populism.
Concerns about presidentialism as a mode of administrative
accountability run deeper than the Trump Administration’s particular
pathologies, however, because of how thoroughly presidential administration
has vanquished its competitors. Recognizing that the most powerful
criticisms of presidential administration contrasted presidentialism with
pluralism,260 Kagan responded that the question was not whether “the
president is better . . . than a pluralist system” but rather whether “greater or
lesser presidentialism within pluralism” was preferable given pluralism’s
inevitability.261 As presidential administration has grown more capacious
over the past two decades, however, this hedge has become less satisfying.
The institutions and practices recognized as composing the pluralist
system—in particular Congress and agency officials, but also interest
groups—have been either marginalized or assimilated into the practice of
presidential administration itself.262 Critics who dispute Kagan’s
“comparative” case tend to insist that Congress or agency heads furnish at
least as much public accountability as the president,263 yet that rejoinder is
largely beside the point in an executive-centered party system where agency

256. See, e.g., SHANE, supra note 250. See generally Mathews, supra note 250, at 633 (arguing
that the “strongly plebiscitary form” of presidentialism “treats national elections, by themselves, as
sufficient to legitimate the subsequent acts of the President,” so that “the removal of obstacles to
executive power” is understood to be “democracy-enhancing”).
257. Kagan was skeptical of such “prior public validation” claims, see supra note 254, and was
herself writing in the wake of the 2000 election, so she recognized that “winning a national election
does not necessarily entail winning more votes than any other candidate.” Kagan, supra note 17, at
2334.
258. Id. at 2335.
259. See, e.g., Mathews, supra note 250, at 633–34 (discussing plebiscitary accounts of
presidentialism and cautioning that a “conception of democracy this thin offers no principled basis
for a critique of autocratic government, so long as it features periodic elections”).
260. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 98, at 988–89 (arguing that only a “plurality of institutions
and practices” can legitimize the regulatory state); Shane, supra note 48, at 212 (concluding that
accountability depends on “the availability of multiple pressure points within the bureaucracy”);
Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 965 (1997) (describing a
“need for structural polyphony” within the government).
261. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2337 n.347.
262. See supra subpart I(B).
263. See, e.g., SHANE, supra note 250, at 158–63.
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heads are continuous with the president and Congress is not competing to
control the bureaucracy.264
The relative and bounded account Kagan proposed has become more
totalizing, and thus less plausible, as presidential administration has
expanded. Responsiveness to the national public’s preferences and interests
is a critical value for administration—even if not the sole source of
accountability—but such responsiveness itself requires multiple connections
between administration and the public.265 Kagan’s resort to a pluralist frame
underscores that the president may be defended as a principal, but not the
only, tether between administration and the public. Her invocation of
unitariness and singular visibility was always premised on an encompassing
pluralist system. As presidential administration has come to denote broader
and more autonomous presidential policymaking, however, the “pluralist
system” in which Kagan sought to situate presidential administration appears
to exist only, if at all, as an aspect of presidential administration itself.
This very recognition appears to motivate the recent internal turn in
administrative law scholarship: lacking plausible political counterweights to
the president, scholars locate new checks and balances within the
bureaucracy.266 But accounts that replace the external separation of powers
and its inherent pluralism with a purely internal separation of powers do not
involve multiple channels for political representation and specifically
electoral accountability. The internal turn reflects a broader supposition of
administrative law scholarship that it is simply not possible to more fully
conjoin administration and representative democracy.267
The longstanding state role in presidential administration suggests,
however, that we may be giving up too easily on this project. States
264. See supra subpart I(B). See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation
of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006) (arguing that the partisan composition of
Congress and the presidency overshadows the separation of powers as such in determining whether
the branches will compete).
265. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 98, at 988–89 (“No single mode of democratic legitimation
can serve to mediate between the . . . will of the people and the modern regulatory enterprise.”); cf.
Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 1084, 1112–
13 (2011) (reviewing ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM (2010)) (arguing that both the resolution of substantive issues and the proper site of
resolution of these issues should frequently be left to constitutional politics); Victoria Nourse, The
Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749, 750–54 (1999) (framing the separation of powers
and the necessary division of representation among competing institutions as a matter of the various
political relationships between the people and government officials).
266. See supra subpart II(B) (describing the internal turn in recent administrative law
scholarship).
267. Proposals to merge the two have long tended toward the implausible yet illuminating
illustration, not the earnest suggestion. E.g., Stewart, supra note 39, at 1791–802 (noting that
“[p]opular election of agency officials would serve to legitimate the exercise of legislative powers
by administrative officials by invoking the same formal principle that legitimates the exercise of
such power by legislators,” but concluding that “[t]he effort to utilize representative principles to
control and legitimate agency discretion seems ultimately to lead to a dead end”).
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disaggregate national majoritarian preferences and introduce multiple
channels of political representation into the administrative sphere.268 For the
many administrative decisions that demand popular engagement, states may
render presidential administration itself plural and more broadly
representative than presidential decisionmaking alone.269 Federalism
suggests that popular control over governmental decisionmaking is not a
question of simple majoritarianism versus countermajoritarianism.270
Consistent with pluralist premises, we need not reduce popular will to a
single preference—all the more worrisome when this is not a majority
preference formed through the mutual accommodation of a multimember
body, but simply the equation of the president with a unitary national

268. In this sense, states act consistently with their celebrated role as laboratories of democracy.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.”). That these laboratories may be functioning as national partisan laboratories does not
undermine their ability to bring pluralism and diverse political representation into federal
administration. See generally Bulman-Pozen, supra note 163, at 1124–30 (exploring states as
laboratories of partisan politics). In recognizing the states as democratic-administrative units, this
Article shares commitments with democratic experimentalism and (at least some forms of) new
governance. See, e.g., Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and
Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 1 (Gráinne de Búrca
& Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342
(2004); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2011). But these theories tend to regard the principal
administrative challenge as problem-solving amid uncertainty and complexity and to emphasize
direct democracy and deliberation, not representation and elections. Some of the accounts
specifically privilege procedure, participation, and transparency as forms of such democratic
deliberation, thereby tracking the recent internal turn in administrative law scholarship more
generally. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, in EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: TOWARDS A NEW ARCHITECTURE 1, 12, 18–21 (Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan
Zeitlin eds., 2010) (embracing a shift from principal–agent governance to “peer review through fora,
networked agencies, councils of regulators, and open methods of coordination,” and emphasizing
“transparency” and “participation” as democratic requirements); supra subpart II(B). See generally
PETER L. LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING EUROPE AND THE NATION-STATE
264 (2010) (arguing that “decentralized forms of experimentalist governance . . . disciplined by
transparency, participation, and reason-giving” might yield “technocratic domination without the
possibility of any kind of plebiscitary leadership, strongly legitimated via representative
government”). By contrast, this Article seeks more directly to account for today’s polarized politics
and existing channels of representative government. Instead of anticipating cooperative learning, it
expects agonistic partisanship. Instead of championing direct deliberation, it focuses on political
representation. And instead of proposing new institutions, it relies on the ones we have.
269. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 184, at 1009–15 (describing how executive federalism may
advance democratic representation and focusing on the disaggregated quality of state
policymaking).
270. See Bressman, supra note 41, at 481–91 (describing the influence of the majoritarian
paradigm).
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constituency.271 Instead, we can understand popular will and majoritarian
preferences to inhere in the aggregation of multiple policy choices.
Even an executive-dominated federal system is therefore more broadly
representative, and potentially responsive to the general electorate, than a
unitary system insofar as it involves fifty elected governors alongside the
president.272 These governors are independently responsible to state
constituents, not mere repositories of federal authority. Moreover, while
executives exercise an outsized role at the state level as well,273 state
legislatures also set policy on questions that have been left to agencies at the
federal level. A number of recent accounts have cast notice-and-comment
rulemaking as a surrogate for legislation, one that may be necessary to
counterbalance presidentialism with additional popular inputs, but the
analogy is necessarily limited.274 State legislatures actually engage in
lawmaking. When California adopted net-neutrality rules, it did so through
legislation. When it adopted sanctuary policies limiting cooperation with
federal immigration enforcement, it did so through legislation. When it
adopted climate-change regulation, fair-housing regulation, and more, it did
so through legislation. Policies that had been a matter of purely
administrative action at the federal level became a matter of legislation at the
state level, with the sort of electoral representation that defines legislative but
not administrative bodies.275 And although California has pride of place as

271. For instance, the leading account of popular control over administration prior to
presidentialism’s ascendancy, interest representation, took the legislative standard as a given; it
suggested that the legislative process was in broad strokes replicated by interest-group participation
in administrative processes. When the presidential-administration model dethroned the interestrepresentation model, “it changed the locus of popular control from interest groups to the one
governmental actor responsive to the entire nation.” Id. at 485–86.
272. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 184, at 1009–10.
273. See Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L. REV. 483, 484 (2017);
see also David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEXAS L. REV. 763, 763 (2017)
(arguing that cooperative federalism regimes should empower state executives over legislatures
because gubernatorial elections are less second-order than state legislative elections).
274. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 93, at 2081; Ross, supra note 108, at 574–75.
275. See generally David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT.
REV. 19, 19 (“Article I of the Constitution entrusts the legislative power of the United States to
Congress, so that democratically elected representatives will determine national policy.”); Mark E.
Warren & Jane Mansbridge, Deliberative Negotiation, in AM. POLITICAL SCI. ASS’N, NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT IN POLITICS 86, 87 (Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013) (“Because
Congress is composed of many representatives, elected from every part of the country, it . . . can
come far closer than the executive to representing and communicating with the people in all of their
plurality.”). But see M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 625 (2001) (“[B]road-brush efforts to match the institutional
competency or normative suitability of a ‘branch’ with the exercise of a particular power are
destined to fail.”).
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the “State of Resistance”276 in the Trump era, other states have likewise
adopted legislation in the place of federal regulation.277
The distinct set of critics who understand the administrative state to be
usurping Congress’s authority might respond that state legislatures cannot
stand in for the federal one. But the case is strong. State legislatures, too,
advance values associated with representative lawmaking,278 and they are
arguably more representative than Congress itself.279 Moreover, state
legislatures today operate with a national, and not merely state-specific,
orientation. In recent decades, state elections have come to closely mirror
national elections: when individuals vote for state legislators, they use the
same partisan heuristics and focus on the same policy issues as when they
vote for members of Congress.280 As Congress has been absent from major
policy decisions—from protection for Dreamers to deportation, Medicaid
expansion to work requirements, climate change regulation to its repeal—
state legislators have taken sides, and state voters have both spurred and
reacted to this role.281 State elections have become plausible substitutes for
276. MANUEL PASTOR, STATE OF RESISTANCE: WHAT CALIFORNIA’S DIZZYING DESCENT AND
REMARKABLE RESURGENCE MEAN FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE (2018).
277. See, e.g., supra notes 11–16; supra subpart IV(A). In addition to legislation, many states
use ballot initiatives and referenda, which may furnish possibilities for less mediated popular
authorship as well. Like other aspects of state democracy, the initiative and referendum process is
easy to criticize—subject to special-interest capture, prey to voter ignorance and misinformation—
but it is a powerful, existing mechanism for popular participation, and recent initiatives concerning
criminal law, voting, and healthcare provide some fresh support for the “when the people lead, the
leaders will follow” school of thought. Stephen Wolf, Here’s How 2018 Ballot Measures Turned
Out on Health Care, Criminal Justice, Climate, and More, DAILY KOS (Dec. 3, 2018, 1:42 PM),
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2018/12/3/1814022/-Here-s-how-2018-ballot-measures-turnedout-on-health-care-criminal-justice-climate-and-more [https://perma.cc/P2WZ-AKT5] (compiling
November 2018 ballot initiatives).
278. E.g., NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PRINCIPLES AND GENEALOGY
(2006); Jeremy Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, 89 B.U. L. REV. 335 (2009).
279. Vicki C. Jackson, The Democratic Deficit of United States Federalism? Red State, Blue
State, Purple?, 46 FEDERAL L. REV. 645, 652 (2018) (“Based on the one-person, one-vote principle,
state legislatures and Governors now have an arguably stronger claim to democratic legitimacy in
representing the people of their respective states than does the Congress in representing the people
of the United States.”).
280. See generally DANIEL J. HOPKINS, THE INCREASINGLY UNITED STATES: HOW AND WHY
AMERICAN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR NATIONALIZED (2018) (explaining that Americans use the same
criteria to choose candidates across state and national elections and are engaged with national more
than state and local political questions); Bulman-Pozen, supra note 163 (arguing that states are sites
of national partisan policymaking and national partisan affiliation).
281. For example, in “blue” New York State, Republicans had controlled the state Senate almost
continuously since the 1970s, but in 2018 a campaign focused on national issues including health
care, immigration, and climate change yielded high voter turnout and flipped seats so that
Democrats assumed a trifecta. See, e.g., The Creative Resistance, Lulu Land, YOUTUBE (Oct. 24,
2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5mESf-kjuSI
[https://perma.cc/89S9-FHMV]
(describing insurgent campaign attempting to focus state primary election on national issues);
Vivian Wang, Democrats Take Control of New York Senate for First Time in Decade, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/nyregion/democrat-ny-senate.html [https://
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federal elections. The nationalizing of state politics may threaten certain
traditional values of federalism,282 but it facilitates pluralist
intergovernmental presidential administration.
B.

Effectiveness

Even assuming presidential administration served “democratic norms,”
Kagan’s account further insisted, it should also be measured against the
arguably conflicting standard of regulatory effectiveness, by which she meant
especially “a certain kind of dynamism or energy in administration, which
entails both the capacity and the willingness to adopt, modify, or revoke
regulations, with a fair degree of expedition, to solve perceived national
problems.”283 Here again, Kagan maintained, the president had the
comparative edge. As a single individual, he could “act without the
indecision and inefficiency that so often characterize the behavior of
collective entities”; as the head of the entire executive branch, he could
coordinate the work of multiple agencies and set coherent regulatory
priorities; and as an electorally accountable actor, he could “energize
regulatory policy.”284
Kagan was well aware that “energy in the executive”285 might just as
easily be framed as “tyranny” and a departure from constitutional checks and
balances.286 But she maintained that “modern political developments,”
particularly increasing periods of divided-party government, had yielded “a
greater need for energy in government.”287 Political gridlock and
administrative ossification could only be overcome by a powerful
president—and the risk of excessive unilateral power would itself be
contained by the president’s political accountability and the “inevitably”
pluralist system she had likewise resorted to in defending such
accountability.288
As with the accountability argument, the extension of the trends Kagan
addressed—particularly with respect to partisan polarization and
congressional gridlock—has rendered this hedge less convincing. Prominent
perma.cc/2PXS-W9GAA] (“The Democrats had campaigned on a decidedly Washington-focused
message, latching on to the language of a national ‘blue wave’ and promising to strike back at the
Trump administration.”). In its first session, the newly elected New York government passed
significant legislation with respect to abortion, immigration, climate change, voting, LGBTQ rights,
and more. See Bills & Laws, N.Y. ST. SENATE, https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation [https://
perma.cc/NB94-55HJ] (compiling recent legislation).
282. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 273.
283. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2339.
284. Id. at 2339, 2341.
285. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.”).
286. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2342–43.
287. Id. at 2343–44.
288. Id. at 2337 n.347, 2345–46.
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critiques argue that the balance has swung too far in favor of executive
power,289 and in the age of Trump, the risks of an unchecked president loom
particularly large.290
Less apparent, but in some respects a more direct challenge to Kagan’s
own account than the threat of unilateral executive power, presidential
administration in an age of polarization may not be very effective, at least in
the sense of producing policy results. Presidents have been relying more and
more heavily on agencies to set domestic policy—but in so doing, they come
up against limits on agency power.291 Even when presidential control over
agencies is no obstacle, these agencies themselves may not possess sufficient
authority to advance the president’s regulatory agenda. The limits on
effectiveness are still more pronounced over time. As Mashaw and Berke
note in considering the transition from one president to the next, “energy”
may come to “seem like a Sisyphean doing and undoing of the same
policies—an expensive repetition that thwarts the policy goals motivating
both the enactment and rescission.”292 Regulatory whiplash is not a useful
sort of vigor.
States may ameliorate each of these problems—the risk of unchecked
authority; the president’s inability to achieve policy goals in the first instance;
and the president’s inability to confer staying power on her policies. Perhaps
most apparent, and consistent with longstanding celebrations of federalism
as a check on national power, states introduce pluralism and outright
contestation into the administrative domain. When the president is not the
only political author of administrative policy, the risk of energy as unchecked
authority is diminished. Of course, with this check also comes a
diminishment in presidential energy itself. The president is no longer a
unitary, dynamic actor responsible for setting policy; instead, fifty other
governments have a role. But, much as states complicate concepts of a
national majoritarian policy preference through disaggregation, so too can
they complicate the idea of energy. The president may be less energetic and
effective in certain jurisdictions, but she will be more so in others.
Indeed, it is important to recognize states as an extension of, and not
only a check on, presidential power. Successful presidential administration is
what raises the specter of tyranny, but presidential administration fails on its
own terms if it does not entail viable presidential policymaking. State
cooperation addresses the latter problem, even as state opposition speaks to
the former. States allow presidents to advance policies that federal agencies
themselves may lack authority to adopt. Recall, for example, how on Kagan’s
own account, President Clinton could not implement his youth-smoking or

289.
290.
291.
292.

See, e.g., SHANE, supra note 250.
See, e.g., Farber, supra note 18.
See supra section IV(A)(1).
Mashaw & Berke, supra note 10, at 610.
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family-leave policies without the states; federal agencies lacked sufficient
authority.293 States were even more critical to President Obama’s major
initiatives.294
Moreover, these states may furnish durability to administrative
policymaking that federal agencies cannot.295 Durability itself might seem to
cut against “energy”; Kagan’s account included modification and revocation
as hallmarks of the dynamism she celebrated. And if the alternative is
stasis—as suggested by Kagan’s emphasis on divided government and
administrative ossification—then perhaps even regulatory whiplash is to be
preferred. Certainly it is more “energetic” than inaction pure and simple. But
states suggest we need not be limited by this dichotomy. Because there are
numerous states, they enable multiple forms of activity, severing any
assumed connection between action and unitariness. Moreover, while state
institutions, particularly legislatures, are often themselves collective bodies,
the prevalence of unified party government at the state level means that states
act more readily than accounts of inefficient collective bodies suggest.296
More generally, intergovernmental presidential administration
highlights tradeoffs with respect to time and space: reduced geographical
scope for a policy may yield greater staying power, and vice versa. At any
given moment, fifty states yield greater variation than the federal
government. If a leading benefit of administrative governance is national
uniformity, and orderliness and predictability that even federal courts cannot
provide,297 the variety, even chaos, of multiple state policies appears
discordant with this objective. But the equation of federalism with
inconsistency and of federal administration with consistency assumes a
particular moment. Over time, particular states may in fact generate greater
consistency and, with it, longer lifespans for policy development.
The combination of political polarization and presidential dominance
within the federal government means that administrative decisions may be
dramatically modified with every new presidential election.298 Recall the
Trump Administration’s response to President Obama’s policies: the Clean
Power Plan, net-neutrality rules, and DACA and DAPA—among numerous
other agency actions—have all been withdrawn.299 But things are not that
simple outside Washington. Even as allied states have amplified both
293. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 180–84 and accompanying text.
295. Again, the Obama–Trump transition is illustrative. See supra notes 11–16 and
accompanying text; supra subpart IV(B).
296. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 17, at 2339 (noting the “indecision and inefficiency that so
often characterize the behavior of collective entities”).
297. E.g., Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1105 (1987).
298. See, e.g., Mashaw & Berke, supra note 10, at 607.
299. See supra notes 1–6, 180–86 and accompanying text.
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President Obama’s and President Trump’s policy choices, opposed states
have limited each chief executive’s reach. The sheer number of states and
extent of current partisan division means that states will themselves be
divided on policy questions. And as some states perpetuate the commitments
of a prior presidential administration, they can render federally fragile
policies more resilient within their borders.
Conclusion
We still “live today in an era of presidential administration.”300 Political
and doctrinal obstacles to presidentialism have been removed by an
executive-centered party system and a judicial embrace of presidential
control over agencies. Yet the very strength of presidential administration in
Washington yields vulnerabilities. Policies emerge from agency action, but
they are readily undone when the presidency changes hands. Courts insist on
greater presidential identity with agency policymaking, but they also limit
the scope of such policymaking.
Federalism complicates this picture. States enhance presidential
administration, allowing presidents to realize policy objectives beyond
federal agencies’ capacity and furnishing a degree of stability in the face of
federal regulatory whiplash. But states also oppose presidential decisions and
introduce new forms of pluralism and representation to the administrative
sphere. Scholars worried about aggrandized presidential power are
increasingly looking to bureaucracy and administrative procedure. Yet while
expertise, deliberation, and reason-giving are critical to the administrative
state’s legitimacy, these internal values do not tie administration to
representative politics—an imperative not only of administrative authority
but also of democratic governance in an age of administration. States provide
additional channels for political responsiveness in a president-dominant
system: instead of a single elected official, the administrative domain
includes fifty governors and more than seven thousand legislators. In the
decades ahead, administrative states, not a unitary administrative state, are
our best hope of marrying democracy and bureaucracy.

300. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2246.

